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New and Seasoned Corporate Bonds,
1952—63 Joseph W. Conard and Mark W. Frankena
I. Introduction and Summary of Findings
Recorded data indicate that in the period since the 1951 Accord there
has generally been a substantial excess of yields on new corporate
bond issues offered to the market above the average yield on ap-
NOTE: We are indebted to many people for their aid in providing data and suggestions
for this study. We especially want to thank Sidney Homer of Salomon Brothers and
Hutzler, who provided us with hypotheses to test, much of the basic data, and invaluable
information without which the study would not have been possible. Also, we thank
Moody's Investors Service for permitting us to use their series and to work with the
data underlying their published series. Mortimer Kaplan of the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration has likewise been generous in providing data underlying his Journal of
Finance article of March 1962, and William H. White of the International Monetary
Fundhaskindly sent us some of his unpublished material in addition to providing useful
suggestions and criticisms. Ronald Bodkin of the University of Western Ontario, Jacob
Mincer of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and Robert Summers of the
University of Pennsylvania have given needed advice on statistical procedures, and
Geoffrey H. Moore of the National Bureau and Roger F. Murray of the Teachers In-
surance and Annuity Association discussed many of our problems with us. Eleanor
Barr's assistance in collecting data, carrying out statistical tests, and preparing charts
in the early stages of this study was invaluable.
An article prepared by William H. White in 1957 and published in the March 1962
Staff Papers of the IMF, after our hypotheses were formulated and testing had been
begun but before the initial draft of this study was completed, suggested several general
conclusions that are strikingly similar to ours. Since our work and his were inde-
pendent up to that stage and used somewhat different procedures—White concentrating
on cross sections rather than time series—this seems to lend substantial support to
many of the conclusions reached.144 Essays on Interest Rates
parently comparable bonds already outstanding.' The average new-
seasoned yield spread as recorded by Moody's for Aa corporate bonds
for the period from 1952 through 1963 was 16.7 basis points. During
extended periods in this interval appreciably higher returns could be
earned on new Aa corporates than on seasoned A-rated bonds, and on
occasion the new Aa's yielded more than seasoned Baa's. Yet, the size
of the new-seasoned yield spread is extremely variable, and on some
occasions new issues sold below the average yield on seasoned bonds
with the same quality rating.
There are a number of reasons for special interest in the determinants
of the yield spread between newly issued and seasoned bonds. Lending
institutions are concerned with the spread as an indication of profit
opportunities. Economists are mainly interested in the implications
yield spreads may have for the efficiency of capital markets and per-
haps for the effectiveness and incidence of monetary policy. Monetary
policy can affect economic activity through new issue yields (the "cost
of funds effect") or through seasoned yields (the "availability" or
"lock-in" effect). The behavior of spreads could shed light on the rela-
tive importance of these channels.
This study is an attempt to explain those yield spreads. Three major
hypotheses were tested: (1) The spreads reflect differences between
the yield-determining characteristics of the bonds used in the new and
seasoned yield averages. (2) The spreads are a result of the under-
writers' pricing policies and arise out of their attempt to minimize the
risk of capital losses on new issues. (3) The spreads are due to transac-
tion costs and imperfections in the capital market which cause yields
in the seasoned market to lag behind those in the new issue market.
Our major efforts were devoted to studying the behavior of new-
seasoned yield spreads for Aa corporate bonds. The analysis included
series prepared by Moody's Investors Service, The Bankers Trust
Company, Mortimer Kaplan of the Federal Housing Administration,
and Sidney Homer of Salomon Brothers and Hutzler.
A major conclusion of this study is that differences between the
average coupon rate on the bonds used in the new issue and seasoned
issue series accounted for roughly half the recorded new-seasoned
yield spread. Over the 1952—63 period as a whole, it was found that
the average coupon rate on the new issues exceeded that on seasoned
term "seasoned" will be used to indicate bonds which have been outstanding
for a period of months or years. The yield spread is measured as the yield on newly
issued bonds minus the yield on seasoned bonds; hence, it is positive when the former
is greater than the latter.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 145
issues by .70 per cent in the Moody series and 1.29 per cent in the
Homer series. Bonds with higher coupon rates carry higher yields be-
cause the danger that they will be called for refunding is greater and the
possibility of capital gains is more limited at times of declining interest
rates. Nevertheless, even after adjustment for coupon rate, it was
found that the average new-seasoned yield spread was approximately 9
basis points in both the Moody and the Homer series.
The bonds in the new issue and seasoned issue series also differed
with respect to other yield-determining characteristics, such as indus-
trial classification, term to maturity, average length of refunding defer-
ment, and sinking fund provisions. These variables appear to have rela-
tively little effect on yield spreads, however. The spread on individual
new issues tends to disappear within two or three months after the
issue is released from syndicate price-maintenance agreements, indi-
cating that the spread remaining after correction for coupon rate dif-
ferences is not due to systematic differences in other yield-determining
characteristics.
Using series which were specially constructed so that coupon rate
was held constant, it was found by multiple regression analysis that the
change in new issue yields for each of the twelve months preceding the
month of the observation explained 60 to 70 per cent of the remaining
variance in yield spread.2 It was also found that the greater was the rise
in yields, particularly in the recent past, the larger was the spread. This
influence of the change-in-yield variables is consistent with either the
hypothesis concerning underwriters' pricing policies or that concern-
ing market imperfections, or a combination of the two.
According to the former hypothesis, if underwriters anticipate a rise
in yields and a fall in bond prices, they will be reluctant to hold new
issues for fear of suffering capital losses. In order to assure that new
issues would sell quickly, underwriters could be expected to increase
their yield, thus increasing the new-seasoned yield spread. If rising
yields in the recent past generate a fear on the part of underwriters that
yields will continue to rise in the near future, the expectation may
cause new-seasoned spreads to increase. This would explain the posi-
tive correlation of the change-in-yield variables with the spread. It
follows that the explanatory power of the change-in-yield variables
might be interpreted as support for the hypothesis that the new issue
spread remaining after correction for coupon differences is due to the
pricing policies of the underwriters distributing new issues.
2Seethe text, Section IV, for an explanation of our reservations on this finding.146 Essays on Interest Rates
The hypothesis that spreads are the result of market imperfections
provides an alternative explanation for the effect of the change-in-yield
variables on the yield spread. If forces determining interest rates
operate more directly and immediately on yields in the new issue mar-
ket and if yields in the seasoned market adjust to their equilibrium level
only with a lag, rising new issue yields in the past would then lead to an
increase in yield spreads because of the failure of yields in the seasoned
market to adjust immediately to the new higher levels.
Both of the above hypotheses are supported by other types of
evidence. Institutional evidence and the tendency for the yield spread
of individual bonds to be eliminated two or three months after they
have been issued both support the capital-market imperfections hy-
pothesis. Also, in months when new issue yields fell but remained
above outstanding yields, the latter more often than not rose, suggest-
ing a lagged response. Finally, the correlation between changes in
seasoned yields in a given month and changes in new issue yields in
the previous month was high, while the correlation between changes in
new issue yields in a given month and changes in seasoned yields in the
previous month was negligible.
On the other hand, there is evidence that underwriters underprice
new issues, at least during periods of rising yields. Yields on recent
issues often decline after the issues have been released from syndicate
even when new issue yields are rising. If new-seasoned yield spreads
were due entirely to the lagging of the seasoned market, the yields on
actively traded, recent new issues should rise along with the yields on
current new issues. Our conclusion, therefore, is that both the hy-
pothesis concerning the pricing policy of underwriters and that con-
cerning market imperfections are important in explaining the new-
seasoned yield spread.
Several variables besides coupon difference and past changes in
yields were tested in the regression equations. It was hypothesized that
because of underwriting risks, the new-seasoned yield spread would in-
crease if there was a larger volume of new issues competing for invest-
ment funds. This hypothesis received moderate but not conclusive
statistical support when we used the volume of corporate securities
issued during the three months preceding the observation of yield
spread as the independent variable.
It was also hypothesized that when new issues have been selling
slowly, underwriters would guard against a further inventory build-up
by bidding lower for new issues to permit their distribution at attractive
prices below those on comparable seasoned issues. This would suggestYield Spread on Corporate Bonds 147
that the new-seasoned yield spread would be positively correlated with
the proportion of slow-moving new issues in the recent past. However,
no statistical support was found for this hypothesis.
The hypothesis that a tight money market would increase the cost
and difficulty of underwriting new issues and, hence, contribute to a
new-seasoned yield spread suggested use of the Treasury bill rate as an
explanatory variable. Again, this hypothesis received no statistical
support.
Ii. The Yield Spread Between New and Seasoned Corporate Bonds,
1952 —63
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM. Chart 5-1 shows the Moody series
for yields on new and seasoned Aa corporate bonds for the period
from 1952 through 1963. It is apparent at once that the spread be-
tween these series is often substantial. In June 1957 it equaled 90
basis points, which was almostone-fourth of the yield on the seasoned
issues. In every month from April 1956 through December 1957, the
investor could have obtained a higher yield on new Aa corporates
than on seasoned A-rated corporates; his average gain, in addition to
securing the higher grade bond, would have been 33.5 basis points.
Yet in 1962—63 the average spread for the Moody series was negative,
reaching a low of —19 basis points. These dates have obviously been
selected to emphasize the extremes to which the spread between new
and seasoned issue yields as recorded by Moody's has moved. Yet the
spread between new and seasoned yields on Moody's Aa corporates
averaged a substantial 16.7 basis points even for the full period from
1952 through 1963, despite periods of negative spread.
The major purpose of this study was to discover and analyze the
determinants of this yield spread. We first attempt to discover factors,
such as differences between the bonds used in the two series or the
existence of uncertainty and risk in the underwriting process, which
could explain the existence of the substantial new-seasoned yield
spread without implying market imperfections. We then examine the
extent to which this spread is due to imperfections or frictions which
could restrict the flow of funds tO the most profitable channels. A
study of the spread between the yields on new and seasoned issues,
and particularly changes in the spread, leads inevitably to a consid-
eration of some of the differences between the markets for new and
seasoned bonds.148 Essays on Interest Rates
CHART 5-1. Moody New and Seasoned Aa Corporate Bond Yields and
Yield Spreads
Percent
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA. Most of our work covers the 1952—63
period, although some of the tests use data through 1966. It begins
after the 1951 Accord when Federal Reserve support of long-term
government bond prices was discontinued. The study uses five dif-
ferent series for the yields on new issues, three series for the yields
on seasoned issues, and modifications of two of the seasoned issue
series. The yield spreads for which an explanation was sought were
measured as the difference between an appropriate combination of
one of the new issue and one of the seasoned issue yield series. Our
method was primarily multiple regression analysis in which the
NOTE: M22 is yield on seasoned issues with coupon rate equal to that on new issues.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 149
variabletobe explained was the new-seasoned yieldspread.
Because the series are quite different in their manner of construc-
tion and because each has certain advantages and disadvantages, a
description of the data and some of the problems they present is
necessary before going on to the statistical tests. The shortcomings
of the series stem primarily from a lack of homogeneity in the bonds
used to derive the new and seasoned yield averages. As a result, the
size and variation in the new-seasoned yield spread between any two
of the series may be influenced in part by differences or changes in
the bonds represented in the averages. For each new issue series, we
describe the seasoned issue series which was used with it to derive
the new-seasoned yield spread.
The Appendix explains the symbols used for the variables in the
multiple regressions, giving an exact definition of each of the series
and listing the data sources. The actual yield series and much of the
other data used in the study are shown in the Appendix.
Moody's Aa Corporate Yield Series. Moody's Investors Service
has compiled monthly series for the average yields on both new and
seasoned bonds by quality rating for the period since January
The averages are based on individual public utility, industrial, and
railroad bonds. Convertible bonds, issues with warrants, serial bonds,
equipment trust certificates, and the obligations of finance, real estate,
steamship, and foreign companies are excluded. The series are broken
down by quality rating for bonds rated from Aaa to Baa. This study
made use of the Aa series, which has a more uniform quality than the
series for bonds with lower ratings and a larger number of new issues
than the series forAaa bonds.
The series for new issues is a monthly average of offering yields,
weighted by the size of the issue, and includes all newly issued corpo-
rates as described above regardless of size of issue and call price or
refunding provisions. The number of new issues included in the Moody
average, as in all of the new issue averages, was very small; there are
eight months during the 136-month period from 1952 to 1963 when no
Aa bonds were issued and twenty-six months when only a single issue
was offered.
Moody's series for seasoned Aa corporate yields is normally based
on about ten industrials, ten utilities, and a half-dozen rails. Yields
are monthly averages of daily quotations obtained from dealers and are
'Publishedin Moody's Bond Survey, February 9, 1959, and subsequent issues, usu-
ally the first weekly edition of each month.150 Essays on interest Rates
computed on the basis of a price midway between the bid and asked
quotations.4
Because our study indicated that a large part of the new-seasoned
yield spread was caused by differences in the average coupon rate of
the bonds in the two yield series, we constructed a special monthly
series for the yield of seasoned bonds with coupon rate equal to the
average coupon rate of new issues for the month. The new-seasoned
yield spread measured as the excess of new issue yields over yields in
this series is therefore free of the influence of differences in coupon
rate; we refer to it as the new-seasoned yield spread corrected for
coupPn.
This series was constructed on the basis of the yields on the indi-
vidual bonds in Moody's series for seasoned Aa corporates. Since there
were a number of months in which there were no seasoned bonds in
Moody's average with a coupon rate equal to the average on new is-
sues for the month, a linear interpolation or extrapolation of yields
at available coupon rates was used. When the procedure required only
interpolation between actual observations, it presented no real prob-
lem. However, at times when new issue yields were reaching unprece-
dented peaks and, hence, new issues had very high coupon rates, there
were no seasoned bonds with comparable or higher coupon rates, mak-
ing it necessary to extend the estimates beyond the range of actual
observations. Such extrapolation had to be employed in 39 of the 136
months during 1952—63.
Bankers Trust Company Grade 2 Public Utility Yield Series. The
Bankers Trust Company compiles a monthly series for new "Grade
2"public utility bonds which differs in several respects from the
Moody series. The average is based on the yields at which Grade 2
utility bonds are successfully placed (rather than offered) during the
month. The series thus tends to be somewhat higher than if it were
based solely on offering yields. For an issue to be included at the of-
fering yield, at least 90 per cent of the issue must have been placed
at the offering yield in the month in question. Issues which were ini-
tially offered in the previous month but which did not sell at that
time may be included in the average for the current month. If a syndi-
A spot check by Andrew Brimmer covering the 112 issues used in all Moody in-
dexes of seasoned issues in September 1958 indicated average differentials of about 9
basis points between the yields calculated from the bid and asked prices. Andrew F.
Brimmer, "Credit Conditions and Price Determination in the Corporate Bond Market,"
The Journal of Finance, September 1960, p. 363.
Grade 2 is approximately equivalent to Moody Aa.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 151
cate terminates before 90 per cent of the issue has been placed, the
yield used is calculated from the mean between the bid and asked
prices at the time the syndicate terminates. The averages are based on
the yields of individual bond issues weighted by the size of the issue.
Some of the circumstances which may cause a modification of this
basic approach for the calculation of the averages are: (1) When no
Grade 2 issues are offered during the month, an estimate of the yield
is made. (2) When there are not enough offerings of Grade 2 bonds over
the whole month to reflect a representative cross section of yields,
an adjustment in the average yield may be made. (3) When there is a
distortion of traditional relations, e.g., Grade 2 yields lower than
Grade 1yields, an adjustment is made. (4) Telephone bonds are in-
cluded when their yields are at the level of Grade 2 yields, despite the
fact that telephone bonds are rated Grade 1.
The seasoned issue series used along with the Bankers Trust new
issue series is Moody's Aa public utility series, which is basically
the same as the Moody's Aa series described above except that it cov-
ers only the ten public utility issues, excluding the industrials and
rails.
Kaplan Recently Issued Aa Corporate Yield Series. In contrast to
the Moody series which is based on unadjusted offering yields, and
the Bankers Trust series which is based on offering yields but with
an upward adjustment for is sues that do not sell well, the series com-
piled by Mortimer Kaplan of the Federal Housing Administration6 is
designed to measure market yields to investors on recent issues after
they have been released from price-maintenance agreements among
members of the underwriting syndicate and are actively traded in a
free market. Weekly yield series are compiled for each quality rating
by averaging the yields to maturity for recently issued corporate bonds
(excluding obligations of finance companies and convertible bonds).
This is done by using the mean of the bid and asked quotations for
each Friday as reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
For Aa issues the average number of bonds used was six, each bond
was used for an average of eight weeks after being released from syn-
dicate, and the average maturity of the bonds used was thirty years.
We converted Kaplan's weekly Aa series into a monthly series by tak-
ing an unweighted average of the yields for each Friday in the calendar
month.
6Mortimer Kaplan, "Yields on Recently Issued Corporate Bonds: A New Index,"
The Journal of Finance, March 1962, pp. 8 1—109, and supplementary data supplied
directly to us.152 Essays on interest Rates
The seasoned issue yield series used with the Kaplan recent issue
series was Moody's series for seasoned Aa corporates, described
above.
Homer Aa Public Utility Yield Series. The fourth series used was
constructed by Sidney Homer of Salomon Brothers and Hutzler.7
The yields are Homer's estimates of the going rate for new callable Aa
utilities as of the first day of each month. (The other three series dis-
cussed above include bonds with call deferments, generally of five
years.) The yields are derived, in most cases, directly from the offer-
ing yield on the new callable Aa utility issue offered closest to the first
of the month; most of the bonds used were issued within a week either
way of that date. Where no callable Aa utility issue was offered close
enough to the first of the month, the yield is derived by interpolation
between the yields of the last bond issued in the previous month and
the first bond of the current month, or by an upward adjustment of the
yield on an Aaa issue or a bond with a refunding deferment. Some slight
upward adjustments in new issue yields were made to correct for issues
which did not sell well, on the assumption that their offering yields did
not accurately reflect market conditions. This, however, was done only
if the issue was not offered within a week of the first of the month.
The seasoned issue series used with the Homer new issue series
was based on six to eight callable Aa and Aaa public utility bonds with
coupon rates of 2* and 2* per cent. Like the new issue series, the
seasoned series pertains to the first of the month. The yields were
calculated from the asked price listed on the daily dealer quotation
sheets of Salomon Brothers and Hutzler and The First Boston Corpo-
ration. The series used was constructed by Sidney Homer for 1952
through 1956 and by Frankena for 1957 through 1963.8
As in the case of the Moody series, we also constructed a monthly
series covering Aaa and Aa callable seasoned public utility bonds with
coupon rate equal to that on new issues. This series was designed to
be used with the Homer new issue series in order to derive a second
measure of the new-seasoned yield spread, one which was free of the
influence of differences in coupon rates between the two series. The
series for 1952—56 was constructed by Homer and ourselves while the
"AnAnalytic Record of Yields and Yield Spreads," available from Salomon Broth-
ers and Hutzler, Wall Street, New York.
8Homer'sseries is in "An Analytic Record of Yields and Yield Spreads," ibid.,
and Frankena's is in his paper "The influence of Call Provisions and Coupon Rate on
the Yields of Corporate Bonds," NBER, (forthcoming).Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 153
series for 1957—63 was prepared by Frankena.9 As in the case of the
Moody series, a linear interpolation and extrapolation was used when
there was no observation for a seasoned bond with a coupon rate equal
to that on new issues. However, such interpolation and extrapolation
was required less frequently in the case of the Homer-Frankena series
because the combined number of bonds used in their series for sea-
soned yields was larger and covered a wider range of coupon rates
than was the case for the Moody series for seasoned Aa corporates.'°
Cohan Aa Utility Thirty-Year Mortgage Bonds. The fifth new issue
series used was a quarterly series constructed by Avery B. Cohan.t'
After running multiple regressions for a series of cross sections dur-
ing the period from 1935 through 1958, Cohan concluded that five
variables in addition to the date of offering significantly affected new
issue yields: quality rating, industrial classification, maturity, type
of bond, and type of transaction with the underwriter. Holding all
five of these variables constant, Cohan constructed quarterly series
by quality rating covering new public utility thirty-year mortgage
bonds bought by underwriters in competitive bidding.
The Cohan series was not used in the multiple regressions but was
compared to other new issue series which do not hold the above five
factors constant.
BOND CHARACTERISTICS WHICH INFLUENCE YIELDS. For a number of
reasons each of the series discussed above may misstate the "true"
new-seasoned yield spread, i.e., the spread between bonds which are
identical except for the length of time they have been outstanding. In
part thisisunavoidable because the number of new corporate
issues each month is too small to permit the construction of a monthly
series for new issues which is homogeneous from month to month or
identical to seasoned issues in all important respects.
Other studies have indicated that certain characteristics of bonds
may have a significant influence on yields, at least in some periods.
Those are chiefly quality-rating, industrial classification, term to
maturity, type of bond (mortgage bond, debenture, collateral trust
9lbid.
Therewere eighteen months when extrapolation was used in the Homer-Frankena
series and thirty-nine in the Moody series.
Avery B. Cohan, "Yields on New Underwritten Corporate Bonds, 1935—1958,"
The Journal of Finance, December 1962, p. 585 if., and supplementary data supplied
directly to us.154 Essays on Interest Rates
bond, etc.), type of transaction with underwriter (whether the sale
of an issue was negotiated between underwriters and the issuer or was
by public sealed bidding), period of refunding deferment, coupon rate,
call price, size of issue, and sinking fund provision.
Not all of these characteristics could be held constant in this study
at the same time. Consequently, some of the average spread could be
due to systematic differences between the bonds used in the new and
seasoned issue series, and some of the variability in the size of the
spread could be due to random changes in the characteristics of the
bonds used. However, by using four different series and modifications
of two of them, the most important of these characteristics could be
held constant for one or another of the series. Table 5-1 provides a
summary of the yield-determining characteristics which are held
strictly constant in each of the five new issue series used.















Quality rating X X X X X
Industrial classification X X X
Term to maturity X
Type of bond X
Type of transaction






The same characteristics are held constant in the seasoned series
corresponding to the first four new issue series, except that the type of
transaction with the underwriter is not relevant and quality is not held
strictly constant in the Homer-Frankena series, which includes Aa and
Aaa rated bonds. The characteristics checked in Table 5-1 are thus not
responsible for any of the new-seasoned yield spread, except possibly
for some spread caused by quality-rating differences in the Homer-Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 155
Frankena series. In addition, for the modified Moody and Homer-
Frankena series, the effect of the coupon rate on the spread is elimi-
nated because the new issue and seasoned issue series carry the same
coupon rate.
Quality rating was held constant in all series except the one for
seasoned yields constructed by Homer and Frankena, where Aaa
rated bonds were used along with Aa rated bonds. There was generally
no very noticeable yield difference between callable Aa's and Aaa's
with the same coupon rate. Also, telephone bonds were rated Aa until
the late 1950's, when they were raised to Aaa.'2
Industrial classification was not held constant by the Moody or
Kaplan series, which include industrials, utilities, and rails, but it was
by the Bankers Trust and Homer series, which used only public
utilities.
Maturity was held strictly constant only in the Cohan series, but the
bonds covered by all the series were relatively long-term. In Moody's
seasoned series maturity was held within the range of twenty-five to
twenty-nine years during the 1950's (the range during 1960—63 was
not examined). In the Homer-Frankena seasoned series, maturities de-
clined steadily from 1952 to 1963; the lack, in this period, of new
bonds having coupons of 2*—2* per cent prevented the replacement of
older bonds in the average with newer ones having longer maturities.
By 1963, some of the bonds in this average had a maturity of only six-
teen years. In the Homer-Frankena "current coupon rate" series ma-
turity could be held roughly constant on seasoned bonds because more
recently issued bonds were available to replace the older ones. Aver-
age maturity varied much more within all the new issue series, except
Cohan's, than it did in the seasoned series because of the smaller num-
ber of bonds in the new issue series. For the Kaplan series average
maturity varied between about twenty-five and thirty-seven years dur-
ing the period from 1951 to 1960.
There is a fairly systematic tendency for the new issue series to have
a longer average maturity than the seasoned issue series. The dif-
ference, however, is generally not more than a few years, and the rele-
vant sector of the yield curve is typically fairly flat.13 There is no reason
It should be noted that part of the yield spread between the Moody series with dif-
ferent quality ratings was probably due to differences in the average refunding deferment
on new issues and to differences in the average coupon rate on seasoned issues in the
series; the lower quality series have a lower proportion of deferments and higher average
coupon rates, which raise their yields.
'31t should be noted that at least part of the observed slope of the corporate yield curve
is due to systematic differences in the coupon rate of bonds of different maturities.156 Essays on Interest Rates
to believe that it plays any significant role in the new-seasoned yield
spread.
In order to get a rough idea of how the new issue yield series is
affected by the failure to hold constant industrial classification, term
to maturity, type of bond, and type of transaction with the underwriter,
we compared the Cohan series (which holds these four variables con-
stant) with three other new issue Aa series which do not hold all of
them constant. The other series were Moody's new issue public util-
ity series, Moody's new issue corporate series, and Bankers Trust
new issue utility series. Since the Cohan series is quarterly, we used
quarterly averages for the other series. Table 5-2 presents the four
quarterly series and the average difference between the Cohan series
and the others. In only two quarters was the difference larger than 8
basis points. In the other quarters the differences were of the same
order of magnitude as the differences between the Bankers Trust and
Moody's corporate series, shown in the last column. It was concluded
that variability in term to maturity, type of bond, and type of trans-
action did not systematically distort the new-seasoned yield spread
in any serious way.
Some work by Frankena indicates that call protection in the form of
refunding deferments significantly reduces yields on high coupon
bonds. The reason is that such protection makes the bonds more at-
tractive to investors.'4 Since low coupon bonds are unlikely to be called
in any case, call restrictions do not influence low-coupon bond yields
to the same degree. The Homer new issue series and the Homer-
Frankena seasoned issue series exclude bonds with call deferments.
For new issues included in the other three series, call deferments
were more common and covered a longer period than in the seasoned
issue series to which they were compared, thus reducing the new-
seasoned yield spread. Call deferments came into common use only
after 1957, however; by and large, it was only in 1959—61 that new
issue coupons were high enough for the market to place any appreci-
able value on such protection. Our estimate is that in late 1959—61
the new issue series and hence the new-seasoned spreads (apart from
Homer's) averaged about 5 basis points below what they would
have been if only callable issues had been used.15
One of the findings of this study and an independent study by Wil-
14Frankenastudy.
15Frankena'sstudy indicates that refunding deferments reduced yields on new issues
by roughly 15 basis points relative to yields on comparable freely callable issues in
this period and that about one-third of new issues had such call protection.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 157












and Other Series Bankers Trust
Less Moody
Corporate AlgebraicAbsolute
1952 13.22 3.15 3.28 .5 6.5 13.0
Ii3.17 3.17 3.19 —1.0 1.0 2.0
LII3.18 3.19 3.25 —4.0 4.0 6.0
IV3.13 3.13 3.22 —4.5 4.5 9.0
1953I3.35 3.34 3.34 1.0 1.0 0
II3.69 3.74 3.79 —7.5 7.5 5.0
III3.68 3.72 3.67 —1.5 2.5 —5.0
IV3.33 3.26 3.35 2.5 4.5 9.0
1954 13.06 3.04 3.09 —.5 2.5 5.0
II3.02 3.02 3.03 —.5 .5 1.0
III3.02 3.04 3.06 —3.0 3.0 2.0
IV3.03 3.03 3.05 —1.0 1.0 2.0
1955I3.15 3.19 3.19 —4.0 4.0 0
II 3.23 3.22 3.24 .0 1.0 2.0
III 3.32 3.41 3.37 —7.0 7.0 —4.0
IV3.30 3.27 3.30 1.5 1.5 3.0
1956I3.24 3.20 3.21 3.28 1.0 3.7 7.0
II3.58 3.63 3.63 3.60 —4.0 4.0 —3.0
ill3.96 4.01 3.93 4.00 —2.0 4.0 7.0
IV4.25 4.25 4.21 4.27 .7 2.0 6.0
1957 14.37 4.36 4.31 4.36 2.7 2.7 5.0
II4.58 4,53 4.53 4.67 .3 6.3 14.0
Ill4.79 4.82 4.79 4.87 —3.7 3.7 8.0
IV4.72 4.71 4.68 4.73 1.3 2.0 5.0
1958I3.96 3.91 3.91 3.91 5.0 5.0 0
II3.87 3.86 3.85 3.93 —1.0 3.0 8.0
III4.18 4.29 4.39 4.40 —17.7 17.7 1.0
IV4.47 4.50 4.50 4.54 —4.3 4.3 4.0
1959I4.49 4.46 4.45 4.54 .7 4.0 9.0
II4.85 4.87 4.82 4.86 .0 2.0 4.0
III4.86 5.11 5.11 5.07 —23.7 23.7 —4.0
'IV5.15 5.16 5.16 5.24 —3.7 3.7 8.0
1960 14.90 4.90 4.90 5.01 —3.7 3.7 11.0
II4.85 4.86 4.86 4.88 —1.7 1.7 2.0
III4.60 4.55 4.56 4.61 2.7 3.3 5.0
IV4.80 4.80 4.78 4.80 .7 .7 2.0158 Essays on Interest Rates
ham H. White 16isthat differences in coupon rate are responsible
for a large part of the new-seasoned yield spread as measured by
series like Moody's. This study takes account of coupon rate dif-
ferences in two ways. First, the difference in average coupon rate
between the new issue and seasoned issue series is used as an inde-
pendent variable in explaining the new-seasoned yield spread. Second,
as explained above, two additional seasoned issue series were con-
structed having the same coupon rate as those on the Moody and the
Homer new issue series. The influence of the coupon rate on yield
spreads is examined further in Section III.
Call price was not held constant in any of the series nor was it
used as a variable in the multiple regressions. In general, new issues
probably have more call protection in the form of higher call prices
(although not in the form of coupon rates) than do seasoned issues,
and, on this count, the new issues would tend to have lower yields.
However, part of the impact of the call price on yields will be picked
up by the coupon rate, which is positively correlated with the call
price. This implies, of course, that the effect of the coupon rate on
yields is underestimated when call price is not taken into account.
The size of the issue was not held constant in any of the series. How-
ever, all the series were dominated by issues with a principal of over
$10 million, and we would not expect size variation to have any ef-
fect on yield.17
Some of the series, particularly those with industrials, include bonds
with sinking funds. Sidney Homer informs us that if sinking funds ac-
cumulate more than 2—3 per cent of the issue per year, there will be
a significant reduction in yield to maturity. This is due to the commit-
ment of the borrowing company to repurchase a certain amount of the
issue each year, which constitutes an additional source of demand for
these bonds. Company treasurers may be most active in purchasing
sinking fund issues when they can be obtained at bargain prices; and,
in a thin market like that for seasoned corporate bonds, the result
would be to reduce the yields on sinking fund issues. According to
Homer, yield reductions of 10 to 50 basis points are not uncommon.
Two tests of this hypothesis failed to reveal any appreciable effect
'6William H. White, "The Structure of the Bond Market and the Cyclical Variability
of Interest Rates," Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, March 1962.
Cohan found no statistically significant effect of size of issue on yield in the
case of corporate bonds. Richard West concluded that "issue size has little, if any, in-
fluence on yield spreads" in the case of state and local government general obligation
bonds. Richard West, "New issue Concessions on Municipal Bonds: A Case of Monop-
sony Pricing," The Journal of Business, April 1965, p. 143.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 159
of sinking funds on yields, but neither test was very powerful. Conard
classified the bonds in the Moody Aa seasoned corporate series by
industrial classification and coupon group, comparing the yields on
sinking fund issues with other yields in each group, monthly from 1951
through 1961. There were no consistent differences in yield, but the
number of observations was very small, and no distinction was made
concerning the size of the sinking fund. The second test was by Avery
Cohan.18 Cohan's multiple regression analysis revealed sinking fund
provisions to be a statistically significant influence on new issue
yields in only one year (1943) between 1935 and 1958—even then sig-
nificant only at the 10 per cent level. However, this negative finding
could be explained largely by the fact that the period he examined
was primarily one of low interest rates, while the hypothesis suggests
that sinking funds would have their greatest effect on yields when
interest rates were high.
Because sizable sinking funds are common in industrials but rare in
utilities, they may provide a source of heterogeneity in the Moody and
Kaplan series but not in the Bankers Trust or Homer series.
In summary, a great many factors may influence corporate bond
yields. Some of these factors, such as quality rating or industrial
classification, are held constant in one or another of the statistical
series used. Other factors (such as, maturity, size of issue, or sinking
funds) are not held constant in the series but evidence of various types
suggested that they were neither an important nor systematic influence
on the yield spread. One factor, the coupon rate, is responsible for a
large part of the yield spread and is treated explicitly in the analysis.
We ran a statistical test in Section IV to assure ourselves that the
differences in the bonds included in the new issue and seasoned aver-
ages, which we dismissed as unimportant, were not—even in combina-
tion —responsiblefor any appreciable part of the yield spread remain-
ing after taking account of coupon rate. The spread for individual new
issues was recalculated one month after the offering, two months after,
and so on. If the yield spread at the time of offering is due to differences
in the yield-determining characteristics of the new and seasoned bonds,
the spread should persist after the issue becomes seasoned. In fact,
the differential tends to decline after the issue has been released from
syndicate and is eliminated entirely in two or three months.
PROBLEMS IN THE CORRECT MEASUREMENT OF THE YIELD SPREAD. One
problem involved in measuring the yield spread is that some new issues
18Cohan,ibid.160 Essays on Interest Rates
are mispriced; for that reason their offering yields may not accurately
reflect new issue yields. In order to estimate the significance of this
problem, a series was constructed for "fast-moving" utility issues only.
Fast-moving utility issues are defined as those no longer in syndicate
on the first Monday after the date of their issue. In one test a regres-
sion was run between new-seasoned spreads and the level of yields,
covering the period from 1951 to 1960, first using fast-moving utilities,
then all utilities, for the measure of new issue yields. In a second test
the correlation was between new-seasoned spreads and changes in the
level of seasoned rates. Results are shown in the following table:
Correlation Between Yield Spread and
Level of Yields Change in Yields
Fast-moving securities .597 .457
All securities .526 .374
The fact that the correlation is improved in both cases when only fast-
moving issues are used suggests, although it does not prove con-
clusively, that these issues may provide a better measure of new issue
rates and permit the variables used in the regressions to explain more
of the variance in new-seasoned spreads. This would not apply to the
Bankers Trust and Kaplan series, however, since they are based on the
market yields of the issues sold rather than the offering yields.
A second problem arises when measuring the yield spread of the
Moody's series. Seasoned bonds in this series are calculated from a
price midway between the bid and asked prices, whereas the Moody's
and Bankers Trust new issue series which are used with the Moody's
seasoned series are based on the asked price. This causes a downward
bias in the spreads calculated from the Moody's and Bankers Trust
new issue series. No such bias exists in the spread calculated from the
Homer new issue series, since the seasoned series used with it is also
on an asked price basis. Similarly the spread calculated from the Kaplan
new issue series is not biased because both this series and the Moody's
seasoned series used with it are calculated from the midpoint of bid and
ask prices.
Brimmer found that in September 1958 the average difference be-
tween the yields calculated from the bid and asked prices for the bonds
used in Moody's seasoned issue yield series was about 9 basis points.
If this is typical it means that the bias in the spread calculated fromYield Spreadon Corporate Bonds 161
Moody'sand Bankers Trust new issue series is aboutbasis points.
We found that the bid-asked spreads between 1957 and 1964 on the
daily public utility quotation sheets of Salomon Brothers and Hutzler
and The First Boston Corporation were generally betweenand2
points, which implied yield spreads of about 3 to 13 basis points and a
bias of Htobasis points. Typical spreads differed between dealers
and changed somewhat over time.19 As we shall note below, however,
there was no tendency for the bid-asked spread to change system-
atically with the direction of change of new issue yields.
A third measurement problem is that the offering yield on new issues
may not fully reflect market conditions if changes occur in the under-
writing spread, i.e., the difference between the new issue yield calcu-
lated from the price paid by the underwriter and the yield calculated
from the offering price. A study of the behavior of the new-seasoned
spread including the underwriting spread (M4) suggested that this was
not the case. We constructed a monthly series for the average under-
writing spread on Aa corporate bonds, with spreads weighted by the
size of the issue. The simple correlation between the underwriting
spread and the new-seasoned spread was only .22 3. More important,
the underwriting spread was small and relatively stable, averaging 4.4
basis points for the period from 1952 through 1963 with a standard
deviation of only 1.4 basis points. Much of the variation was due to the
fact that industrial bonds generally had a larger underwriting spread
than did utilities and the proportion of industrial bonds varied between
months.
A fInal measurement problem is that the prices on dealer quotation
sheets for seasoned bonds may not reflect the current market if the
bond is inactive. Thus, Sidney Homer notes that "the quotes on the
great mass of seasoned issues are in their nature very different from the
quotes on recent issues and revisions for seasoned issues are made
more rarely." 20 Similarly, in the case of the bid-asked spread, "there
is a good deal of difference between the actual bid-asked spread in the
market for active utility bonds and the spread on most quotation
sheets. Traders often make eighth and quarter point markets in active
issues but quote them much wider on their sheets."2' This can be
viewed as a measurement problem or as an aspect of market behavior.
It is discussed in the latter context in the next section.
Spreads in the late 1950's were typically larger than those in the early 1960's, with
few spreads being over I point in the period 1963—64.
20SidneyHomer, Letter to Mark W. Frankena, July 20, 1965.
21SidneyHomer, Letter to Mark W. Frankena, July 25,1966.162 Essays on Interest Rates
III. Determinants of the New-Seasoned Yield Spread
HYPOTHESES. Heterogeneity of Bonds: Differences in the Coupon
Rate. The only bond characteristic which is a consistently important
cause of yield spreads between new and seasoned issues is the coupon
rate.22 During a period of generally rising rates, new issues will carry
higher coupon rates than outstanding ones and issues with higher
coupon rates carry higher yields. This is mainly because bonds with high
coupon rates are more likely to be called for refunding at times of low
new issue yields, and holders would have to reinvest at lower yields.
Also, capital gains on high coupon bonds would be more limited in the
event of a decline in yields.23
A borrowing company is normally able to call its bonds prior to ma-
turity at a premium of a few points above par. Borrowers generally
exercise this option at times of low new issue yields, when they can
refund at a lower interest cost. Given the level of new issue yields,
the primary determinants of the profitability of calling an outstanding
issue are its call price and its coupon rate. The higher the coupon rate
the greater is the current interest cost of the issue and the more profit-
able it would be to refund it at any given call price. The higher the call
price the higher is the cost of call to the borrower and the less profit-
able refunding would be. In practice, when coupon rates on new issues
increase, call prices are not increased enough to offset the greater profit-
ability of calling the higher coupon issues. As a result, high coupon
issues are more likely to be called than low coupon issues. The call-
ing of high coupon bonds at a time of low new issue yields means a loss
for the investing institution holding the bonds if it would otherwise
have held them to maturity. This is because the funds repaid can be re-
invested only at a lower yield, and reinvestment involves transaction
costs.
High coupon bonds are also less advantageous to the investor be-
cause such bonds are less likely to generate capital gains when inter-
22However,because of the small number of new issues each month, other differences
between the bonds in the series are no doubt the source of random fluctuations in the
spread. Thus, it appears that the heterogeneity of bonds may explain some of the nega-
tive spreads remaining after the adjustment of the Moody series for differences in cou-
pon rate; negative spreads are less common for the more homogeneous Homer series.
23 effectof the coupon rate on bond yields is the subject of a separate study by
Frankena and the discussion here is based largely on that work. See Frankena's work.
See Joseph W. Conard, The Behavior of Interest Rates: A Progress Report, New York,
NBER, 1966, pp. 120—130, for a preliminary summary.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 163
est rates fall. The market price of a bond cannot rise appreciably above
the call price owing to the danger of call. As noted, the call prices on
very high coupon bonds are at most only a few points higher than those
on low coupon bonds. Because high coupon bonds must sell at a higher
price than low coupon bonds in order to bear the same yield to matur-
ity, the prices on the former are the first to reach the call price when
market yields fall. As a result, capital gains on high coupon bonds are
limited by their call price to a greater extent than are capital gains on
low coupon bonds; for this reason the higher coupon bonds are less de-
sirable. Yield differences resulting from differences in coupon rates are
greatest when market yields are low, since in such circumstances the
call price exercises the greatest constraint on the price of high coupon
bonds. However, there is a very strong positive correlation between
yields and coupon rates on individual bonds at all yield levels.
The influence of coupon rates on yields will give rise to a systematic
positive new-seasoned yield spread when market yields are rising over
an extended period and a negative spread when yields are falling. In
times of high or rising new issue yields as in the late 1950's, seasoned
bonds, issued in earlier years when new issue yields were lower,
typically carry lower coupons than new issues, because of the practice
of setting the coupon rate on new issues at a level approximately equal
to their offering yields so that the bonds will sell near par. For this
reason, the danger of call and the limitations on capital gains will be
less on seasoned (i.e., low coupon) than on new (i.e., high coupon)
issues, and the former will carry lower yields.24 This is one reason
the new-seasoned spreads in Charts 5-1 and 5-2 are greatest when new
issue yields are high and rising.
Underwriting Risks. Another possible source of new-seasoned yield
spreads is uncertainty and risk in the underwriting process. As with
differences in coupon rates, this source of yield spread does not imply
imperfections in the capital market. If underwriting syndicates offered
new issues at yields exactly equal to those on comparable seasoned is-
sues, there might be a lengthy period of distribution which would in-
volve a high probability of capital loss or gain due to shifts in market
conditions during the distribution period. Because they operate with a
fairly thin capital position, underwriters' attitudes toward such gains
and losses may be asymmetrical in the sense that they avoid exposing
themselves to a risk of loss even though it is counterbalanced by an
equal probability of gain. Furthermore, since their capital is limited, a
24 alsoreached this conclusion in his study, p. 126 if.164 Essays on interest Rates
CHART 5-2. Homer New Issue Aa and Homer-Frankena Seasoned Issue
Aa-Aaa Utility Bond Yields and Yield Spreads
Percent
long distribution period reduces the number of issues they can under-
write. As a consequence, underwriters may bid low for new issues and,
to assure rapid distribution, set yields higher than those on comparable
seasoned issues.
This tendency to set relatively high yields on new issues might be
accentuated if underwriters foresaw difficulties in distributing new
issues, for example, if yields were expected to rise in the near future,
or if the total volume of new issues to be marketed in the period were
abnormally large, or if recent new issues had been selling slowly.
Other studies have indicated that expectations of yield change are
NOTE: H21 is yield on seasoned issues with coupon rate of per cent. H22 is yield
on issues with coupon rate equal to that on new issues.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 165
based on an extrapolation of yield changes in the recent past.25 This
can be rationalized on the grounds that there is a strong cyclical pat-
tern in interest rate series, which are based on business conditions
and monetary and fiscal policy decisions, which are themselves re-
lated to business conditions. There is, of course, an opposite tendency,
basic to the Keynesian "speculative motive" for holding cash balances:
When yields have been rising for some time they may be viewed as
high relative to some "normal" interest rate, and the market may there-
fore expect yields to fall back toward normal. However, the two forces
are not mutually exclusive, since when yields are rising one may ex-
pect them to keep rising in the immediate future despite the expecta-
tion that over some longer period they will return to the "normal"
level.26
Inresponse to our inquiry on the tendency of underwriters to extrap-
olate recent yield charges, Sidney Homer writes that "there is no ques-
tion that in bear bond markets underwriters are timid, bid low, and aim
at immediate resale, whereas in rising markets or complacent markets
(protracted stability) they bid high and are content with slow sale. This
is why the spreads of the seasoned market narrow in good markets,
widen in weak markets. It has indeed been occasionally true that new
issue bids are dropped 2 to 4 points when dealers fear a further de-
cline in the market. ..Protracteddiscouragement is evident in the
wide spreads of November 1957 and October 1959." 27
Thevolume of new issues might also influence the bidding and pnc-
ing policies of underwriters. When the volume of new offerings rises,
the market may become congested. The difficulty of selling new issues
and the competition for buyers may force sellers to provide increasing
yield advantages on new over seasoned issues.
Similarly, the speed with which recent new issues were sold might
influence bidding and pricing by underwriters. If recent new issues
have been moving very slowly and inventories are building up, under-
writers might bid lower for additional issues and offer them at more
attractive yields. However, we would expect both new issue volume
and the rapidity with which recent issues have sold to be correlated
with yield changes, so it is not altogether clear that either factor would
25SeeDavid Meiselman, The Term Structureof Interest Rates,Englewood, N.J.,
1962, p. 18 and footnote.
26SeeFranco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy,"
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1966, pp. 178—197, for a
modei which combines the extrapolative and regressive expectations hypotheses.
27Homer,July 20. 1965 Letter.166 Essays on Interest Rates
provide additional information after yield changes are taken into
account.
Underwriters could also be influenced by the interest rates they pay
on funds borrowed to carry new issues. Reliance on bank credit to
finance bond inventories makes it more expensive and difficult in a
tight money market for dealers to obtain funds for the purchase and
distribution of newly issued securities. This might increase the pres-
sure on underwriters to distribute new issues as rapidly as possible by
pricing them attractively. Tightness in the money market might be
measured by the level of short-term rates, the level of free reserves, or
by the yield spread between long-term and short-term securities. The
spread would be a rough measure of the cost to underwriters of carry-
ing their inventories.28
One aspect of underwriting risks has not been considered thus far.
Clearly underwriting risks are greatest on new issues, where the size
of the inventories held is very large. But dealers who trade in seasoned
bonds also assume a risk by holding an inventory and, by analogy to
the argument concerning underwriting risks on new issues, might ad-
just the bid-asked price difference on seasoned bonds in response to the
same factors which would make underwriters adjust their bids and
Offering prices on new issues.
Three spot checks were made to test the possibility that bid-asked
spreads on seasoned bonds may be increased in periods of rising yields.
Each check was a comparison of the bid-asked price spreads for all
bonds common to the quotation sheets of a dealer on two different
dates. One date in each comparison was in a period of rising yields and
the other was in a period of falling yields.29 We compared the bid-
asked spreads on the quotation sheets of Salomon Brothers and
Hutzler for August 1, 1957, a trading day in a period of rising yields,
and January 2, 1958, a day in a period of falling yields. Out of 114
bonds common to the two sheets, 38 showed no change in bid-asked
spread, 59 showed increases, and 17 showed decreases. The aggregate
net change in the bid-asked spreads for all bonds taken together was an
increase of 22* points—the equivalent of about 1 basis point in the
average spread over the 114 issues.
Similarly, we compared the spreads on January 2, 1958, a day in a
28 costis given by holding period yields, which equal yields to maturity only if
interest rates do not change.
29 dayschosen for this test were within broad cyclical phases of rise and decline in
yields, and in each case were preceded by at least four consecutive weeks of rise or de-
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period of falling yields, and September 2, 1958, a day in a period of
rising yields. Out of ninety-three bonds common to the two sheets,
thirty-five showed no change in bid-asked spread, thirty-four showed
increases, and twenty-four showed decreases. The aggregate net
change in the bid-asked spreads was an increase ofpoints, the
equivalent of less than 1 basis point in average spread.
Finally, we compared the bid-asked spreads on the quotation sheets
of The First Boston Corporation for October 1, 1959, a day in a period
of rising yields, and April 4, 1960, a day in a period of falling yields.
Out of ninety-eight bonds common to the two sheets, forty showed no
change in the size of the bid-asked spread, twenty-one showed in
creases, and thirty-seven showed decreases. The aggregate net change
in the bid-asked spreads was a decrease of 11* points, again the
equivalent of less than 1 basis point.
These spot checks show that bid-asked spreads do change, but the
change is not related to the direction of change of yields, and the
quantitative importance of the changes over any large sample of out-
standing issues is very small. It appears that factors affecting under-
writing risk would have a very small effect on the bid-ask spread on
outstanding issues.
Imperfections in the Capital Markets: Lags in the Movement of
Seasoned Yields. Finally, there are explanations for new-seasoned
yield spreads which imply imperfections in the capital markets. As
shall be noted later, spreads on individual new issues decline over a
period of two or three months following the release of the issues from
the syndicate. Neither of the two yield-spread hypotheses advanced
above explains this finding. If yield spreads were based entirely on dif-
ferences in the yield-determining characteristics of the bonds included
in the averages, the spread on individual issues would have little
tendency to decline after release from the syndicate. If yield spreads
were based entirely on underwriting risk, on the other hand, market
forces might be expected to eliminate yield spreads on individual issues
in days instead of months.
For example, suppose a large volume of new issues forces new issue
bond prices down and yields up. Why shouldn't holders of seasoned
bonds immediately sell their holdings and shift into the more attractive
new bonds, thereby reducing the price and increasing the yield on
seasoned bonds? If holders of seasoned bonds are not fully aware of
the current developments in the new issue market (which seems un-
likely) or are not willing to take action, why do no arbitrageurs enter
the market for new issues and immediately equalize rates on similar168 Essays on Interest Rates
new and seasoned bonds? Evidently actions of these kinds do not oc-
cur, at least not on the scale necessary to eliminate yield differentials
quickly. Finally, why would any investor acquire seasoned issues at
yields which are less attractive than those currently available on new
issues?
Holders of seasoned bonds may not switch into new issues with
slightly higher yields because of the transaction costs involved in such
an operation (e.g., the dealer's commission represented by the bid-
asked spread); such behavior would not imply market imperfections.3°
It is clear, however, that transaction costs do not provide a full ex-
planation of the failure of arbitrageurs to equalize new and seasoned
yields, since new-seasoned spreads for bonds with the same coupon
rate are often considerably greater than recorded bid-asked spreads.
Many of the other explanations for the failure to make portfolio
changes can be regarded as forms of market imperfection.
Another reason holders of seasoned bonds may not switch into new
issues is simply that they are not in the business of day-to-day specu-
lation. Institutions such as life insurance companies and pension funds
invest for income and usually hold to maturity. Homer writes that "the
giant funds, with a few exceptions, have felt themselves to be largely
frozen into their bond portfolios. They consider that their investment
activity must be confined largely to the investment of their huge annual
flow of new money. This problem is so stupendous that there is little
room left for portfolio changes. Perhaps many smaller funds have
sacrificed the advantages given them by their smaller size and have
followed a similar policy of ignoring desirable portfolio changes."
Becausebonds are carried and amortized on the basis of cost, in-
vestors may be discouraged from a profitable switch by the reluctance
to acknowledge capital losses (the "locked-in" effect). Homer writes
that "one of the most powerful forces preventing arbitrage is the fact
that almost all institutions carry bonds at amortized cost and, when
prices are low, they would realize an enormous loss by selling. My ob-.
servation is that only a tiny percentage are willing to realize these
Asmentioned before, Brimnier found that in September 1958 the average differen-
tial between the yields calculated from the bid and asked prices for the bonds used in
Moody's seasoned issue yield series was about 9 basis points, and our examination of the
public utility quotation sheets of Salomon Brothers and Hutzler and The First Boston
Corporation for the period 1957—64 indicates bid-asked yield differentials of about 3 to
13 basis points on individual long-term seasoned bonds.
31SidneyHomer, "A Dynamic Approach to Institutional Bond Investment," Salomon
Brothers and Hutzler, New York, 1961, pp. 16—17.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 169
losses. If they did it in a substantial way, capital would be entirely
wiped out for many." 32
Anotherlimitation on switching is that institutional investors often
work under restrictions such as requirements for committee authoriza-
tion and a variety of inflexible conventions and procedures.
Investors may acquire seasoned issues at yields below those on new
issues because of features of specific issues. All Aas are not perfect
substitutes in the eyes of individual buyers. Either diversification or
concentration may be sought, and these objectives may not be satisfied
by the relatively few new issues available. Homer says that "a few
institutions would even buy the higher priced issue just to round out
their previous holding or because they had a committee authority in the
old issue and not in the new,"or we may add in order to average
down the cost of an issue being held. Certain buyers, including those
buying for pension funds, show a preference for seasoned issues which
have been tested by the market as opposed to apparently comparable
new issues. The difference in the size of the transactions involved in
the new and seasoned market no doubt plays a role as well.
The market for seasoned bonds, furthermore, may be so thin that the
attempt to sell any sizable amount would immediately wipe out the
yield differential by driving down prices of seasoned issues. Homer
writes that "the secondary market for most corporate bonds is not good
enough to permit the portfolio manager to make every block trans-
action (at the quoted price) that may appeal to him. My experience is
that about three-fourths of the desired switches can be made at fair
prices in a portfolio when the unit of holding is 50 bonds, about half
when the unit is 100—200 bonds, and a third when the unit is 500—1000
bonds.... Forfunds with blocks of $2—$l0 million, the market is
rarely good enough to permit switches."Hence,after deducting
transaction costs, the gain from arbitrage might be too small to war-
rant the effort.
Buyers, it has been noted, may purchase seasoned bonds at yields
below those available on new issues because of a preference for
specific issues. At the same time, many quotations on seasoned issues
may be nominal in the sense that no transactions actually occur at the
quoted rates. Indeed, particularly for inactive securities, yields on
dealer quotation sheets may not be revised rapidly enough to reflect the
32SidneyHomer, Letter to Mark W. Frankena, November 8, 1967.
Homer, July 20, 1965 Letter.
"A Dynamic Approach to Institutional Bond Investment," p. 16.170 Essays on Interest Rates
yields at which transactions would actually take place if they were
made. It might be that quotations based on actual transactions in sizable
amounts would not show such large spreads. Homer states:
Recent issues, if sizable, enjoy a very active market from the moment the
syndicate price restrictions are removed; the turnover is sometimes enor-
mous, especially if there is a market decline. Many temporary holders get in
and out; markets are usually quoted atpointspreads and are good for many
million bonds either way. Furthermore, many dealers in the Street participate
in these large recent issues and many speculators buy them for small near-
term gains. During the first two or three hours alter the syndicate price restric-
tions are removed, a large part of the total trading has usually been done.
Thereafter, the volume will taper off sharply; but for a period up to, say, three
months it will continue far larger than for seasoned issues. Around that point
trading activity will die out, and the issue will take its place as just one more
seasoned utility. Most Street traders will forget, most speculators will be out,
and only a few people will remember that it exists. It follows that true dealer
markets for recent substantial issues are much more active, and the quotes are
much more sensitive and narrow, than for seasoned issues. Quotes on seasoned
issues tend to lag quotes on recent issues, where all the business is being done.
In other words, the traders will always be changing around the quotes on active
issues, while they will sometimes delay for a few days changing their largely
theoretical quotes on seasoned issues. I say "theoretical" only because they
are not doing very much business in them and are estimating their quotes, in
the absence of real buyers, from the yield book just so the yield will line up
with that of other similar issues. Therefore, the quotes on the great mass of
seasoned issues are in their nature very different from the quotes on recent
issues and revisions for seasoned issues are made more rarely.35
Richard West has concluded that in the case of state and local
government bonds quite a different type of market imperfection —
namely,monopsony in the underwriting and distribution of securities —
Homer, July 20, 1965 Letter. This conclusion should be compared with that of
White who writes that "the available evidence shows an adequately large volume of
transactions in seasoned bonds by professional investors (such as pension funds and the
smaller life insurance companies for whom the market's size is adequate) so that the
prices of many of the larger issues of. seasoned bonds can be assumed to reflect fully the
conditions on the broader, new issue market. And accurate, reliable prices of seasoned
bonds could emerge even if only a very minor fraction of the outstanding amount were
sold during a given year. This is made plausible (although not a certainty) by the
homogeneity of the various bond issues and of investors' interest in them; these
homogeneities should make most holders unwilling to make transactions at the market's
equilibrium price but to make very large transactions at prices that diverge appreciably
from that equilibrium." William H. White, pp. 136—137.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 171
is responsible for part of the spread between new and seasoned yields.
He argues that when only one underwriting bid is made for an issue
the underwriting syndicate can buy a bond at a price below the com-
petitive level. However, to maintain its monopsony status, the bidding
syndicate must share its extra-normal returns with firms which would
otherwise submit competing bids. This sharing is done by reoffering
the bonds at prices below the competitive level and rationing their sale
to those with whom the profits are to be shared. Thus, when there is
only one underwriting bid, the yield spread between new issues and
comparable seasoned bonds is relatively large. West found, however,
that the influence of the number of bids on the yield spread in the state
and local government bond market was limited to offerings that re-
ceived only one or two bids.36 Since the number of bids received for
corporate bonds is normally between two and nine, it is unlikely that
this type of market imperfection explains any of the corporate yield
spread. In addition, West found a virtual disappearance of yield
spreads for single bid issues only two days after reoffering, making it
clear that the spreads are of a different sort from those on corporate
bonds, which persist for two and three months.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYPOTHESES. The different hypoth-
eses advanced to explain the new-seasoned yield spread have quite
different implications for the relationship between the new and sea-
soned issue markets. The hypothesis based on market imperfections
implies that the forces determining interest rates operate most di-
rectly and immediately on new issue yields. The hypothesis which
attempts to explain the spread in terms of the pricing policy of under-
writers, in contrast, does not imply that either the market for new is-
sues or that for seasoned issues is more sensitive to changes in market
conditions (although it does suggest that new issue yields will be more
volatile).37 It implies only that underwriters' expectations about future
West found that on the average a single bid raised the yield spread by 13 basis
points and two bids raised it by 2 basis points, as compared to issues with more than
two bids. West,141.
fact that the new issue series is more erratic than the seasoned issue series
may be due to three things: (1) the number of issues in the new issue series is often con-
siderably smaller than the number in the seasoned series; (2) the large role of expec-
tational forces in determining new issue yields due to the pricing policy of the under-
writers; and (3) the possibility that market forces act more directly on new issue yields,
with the seasoned issue series following a distributed lag adjustment to its equilibrium
level.172 Essays on Interest Rates
conditions in these markets generally cause them to be more or less
concerned about assuring a rapid distribution of their inventories of
new issues.
The hypotheses we have presented are nevertheless complementary
rather than contradictory explanations. Even if we accept the hypoth-
esis concerning the pricing policies of underwriters, this hypothesis
cannot explain a spread which persists for a number of weeks after
the termination of the syndicate. In order to explain the persistence
of the spread even on issues which are similar with respect to all
yield-determining characteristics, we must allow for market frictions
or imperfections.
IV. Statistical Tests
VARIABLES FOR MULTIPLE REGRESSION. Multiple regression analysis
is the major analytical technique used in this part of the study. The
technique involves the regression of a dependent variable, which in










Change in the level of yields — + +
Volume of new issues + +
Level of long-term yields — +, —
Ratio of slow-selling to total
new issues +
Level of Treasury bill yields +
this section will always be the new-seasoned yield spread, on inde-
pendent variables which the hypotheses suggest may explain the vari-
ations in the size of the dependent variable.38 These variables are:
(1) difference in coupon rate between new and outstanding issues;
(2) changes in the level of yields; (3) volume of new issues; (4) level
38Wehave important reservations about some of the regressions run, but the results
will be presented before discussing any problems of interpretation.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 173
of long-term yields; (5) ratio of slow-selling to total new issues; and
(6) level of Treasury bill yields.
Table 5-3 summarizes how each of various independent variables
would be expected to influence the new-seasoned yield spread under
each of the three major hypothese.s regarding the cause of the yield
spread. The direction of the influence is given by a plus or minus sign.
Because of intercorrelation among four of the independent vari-
ables (coupon difference, volume of new issues, level of yields, and
bill rate), it was not advisable to include all of these variables in a
single regression equation. For example, the level of yields and bill
rates are both correlated with coupon differences. When either is
added to a regression that already includes coupon difference, it takes
a large negative coefficient and increases the coefficient of the coupon
difference. In regressions run with data corrected for coupon, the
yield level and bill rate do not show negative coefficients.39 Similar
problems pertain to the variable measuring the volume of new issues.
Because of these statistical problems, the first set of regressions
which will be presented include only the coupon difference and lagged
yield changes as independent variables.
FINDINGS FROM FULL PERIOD REGRESSIONS. We begin with four re-
gressions, one for each of the four monthly new issue series. All the
regressions apply to the full period from 1952 through 1963, though the
number of monthly observations varies as some of the series did not
include observations of the new issue yield for every month. Table 5-4
summarizes the regression coefficients and their t-values when all
variables are included in the regression, along with the F statistic for
the addition of each variable to the preceding ones in the regression,
and correlation coefficients.40 The variable X10 stands for M10 in the
case of the Moody regression, B10 in the Bankers Trust regression,
K10 in the Kaplan regression, and H10 in the Homer regression. The
same pattern follows for X30 through X41. The subscript 1 denotes the
The negative partial correlation of the level of yields and the yield spread in the
regression with data uncorrected for coupon could be explained in part by the fact that
the yield spread (due to any given difference in coupon rate) is lower when the level of
yields is high. However, because of a high degree of multicollinearity between the dif-
ference in coupon rates and the level of interest rates, it seems probable that the cor-
relation is essentially spurious. In any event, the regressions with data corrected for
coupon are theoretically more satisfactory, and chief reliance is placed on them.
4°Anexplanation of the statistical methodology used in this study is provided in any
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 175
new-seasoned spread without correction for coupon, the subscript 10
denotes the coupon difference variable, and subscripts 30 through 41
denote changes in new issue yields. A full explanation of the symbols
is provided in the Appendix.
Coupon Difference. Because of its importance in explaining yield
spreads, the difference in coupon rate must enter the regression equa-
tion when the series used to calculate those spreads do not have the
same coupon rate at each observation. The variable used here is the
difference between the average coupon on the bonds in the two series,
new issue minus seasoned. The hypothesis concerning the effect of
coupon rates discussed above suggests a positive correlation between
yield spread and coupon difference.
The hypothesis is borne out by the four regressions shown in Table
5-4, all of which show a very high simple correlation coefficient (.67
to .82) and high t-values for the b-coefficient in the multiple regression.
Part of the statistical influence of the coupon rate is no doubt due to
its correlation with other variables not included in the regression
equation. The regression coefficient of the coupon difference is large
in absolute terms, ranging from .25 to .29 in the first three regressions.
This implies that a 10 basis point difference in coupon produces a 2
to 3 basis point difference in spread. The coefficient is somewhat
smaller in the Homer regression because the coupon rate was substan-
tially lower for the seasoned Homer series than for the seasoned series
used in the other regressions; and the influence of a given amount of
coupon difference is relatively small at low coupon levels.4'
For a number of reasons, use of a coupon difference variable in a
linear regression equation is a very imperfect way of accounting for
the effect of the coupon rate. The coupon rate and other variables we
wished to include in the regression are intercorrelated. The influence
of coupon differences on yield spread is not linear, and the effect ap-
parently changed over the period studied.42 Moreover, there may be a
reverse influence of yield spread on coupon difference, stemming from
the practice of setting the coupon rate on new issues so that the
issues will sell close to par.43
To deal with these problems, series of seasoned bond yields were
constructed for use with the Moody and Homer new issue series which
41Frankenastudy.
42Frankenafound a marked downward trend in the size of yield spreads due to
coupon differences during the period.
Because of this practice, the new issue coupon rate is an endogenous variable,
and it follows that the difference in coupon rates is an endogenous variable.176 Essays on Interest Rates
carried the same coupon rate as the new issues in each month. In this
way, the influence of coupon differences is eliminated from the new-
seasoned spread, making the data more satisfactory for testing other
explanations of the spread.
The extent to which the spread between new and seasoned issues is
reduced by eliminating the effect of coupon differences is striking.
Charts 5-1 and 5-2 show graphically the effect of this correction for
the Moody and Homer series. The average new-seasoned spread for
the period from 1952 through 1963 was 16.7 basis points for the basic
Moody Aa corporate series when no adjustment was made for coupon
differences. When the spread was measured as the difference between
the new issue yield and the yield on seasoned bonds with the same
coupon rate as the new issues, it averaged only 9.2 basis points.
Similarly, for the Homer series, the average spread was 25.1 basis
points using uncorrected series, but only 9.0 basis points when
measured from the yield on seasoned bonds with coupon rates equal to
those on new issues. Thus, equalization of the coupon rate eliminates
more than two-fifths of the spread in the Moody series and more than
three-fifths of the spread in the Homer series. The larger correction in
the case of the Homer series is due to the lower coupon rate in the
Homer seasoned series.
Changes in the Level of Yields. Both the hypothesis concerning
underwriters' pricing policies and that concerning market imperfec-
tions suggest a positive correlation between past changes in the level
of yields and the size of the new-seasoned yield spread.44 If under-
writers expect yields to continue rising, or if the seasoned market
lags behind the market for new issues, the spread will increase when
new issue yields rise.
The change-in-yield variableswere tested in the four initial regres-
in the case of the regressions for the yield spread measured without correction for
differences in coupon rate, there is another reason for a correlation (negative) of the
spread with the change-in-yield variables: A given coupon difference will have somewhat
less influence on yield spreads when yields are rising. Frankena found that yield spreads
between bonds with different coupon rates were smaller in periods of rising yields. It
was hypothesized that this occurred because the greater call protection and capital gains
potential of lower coupon bonds were given a lower market value when bond prices were
falling.
are defined in the Appendix. Variables X30 through X41 used in Tables 5-4
and5-5areone-month changes in new issue yields with lags of from one to twelve
months preceding the observation to be explained. It may be noted that if only the
market imperfections were involved, the model employed in this paper would be less
plausible than a distributed lag model which assumed that the level of yields on seasoned
issues would adjust to its equilibrium level according to a distributed lag process. ForYield Spread on Corporate Bonds 177
TABLE 5-5. Summary of Regressions for New-Seasoned Yield Spreads
Corrected for Coupon Differences
Independent Variable
(changes in yield) b
Moody: M2 Homer: H2
t F b t F
X30 .524 11.81 56.42 .244 8.81 51.72
X31 .287 6.18 11.09 .143 5.0420.84
.228 4.92 7.43 .093 3.27 10.60
X33 .220 4.77 8.52 .094 3.39 6.03
X34 .224 5.02 12.38 .060 2.20 3.31
.184 4.14 9.16 .071 2.61 8.21
X36 .160 3.57 6.49 .110 4.03 16.58
X37 .178 3.98 8.57 .072 2.65 6.94
X38 .197 4.43 11.97 .043 1.56 2.94
X39 .140 3.09 6.17 .064 2.30 6.4.1
X40 .120 2.68 5.37 .034 1.21 2.33
X41 .143 3.17 10.07 .032 1.17 1.36
Constant .070 .081
Number of observations 121 •144
Mean of yield spread .097 .090
S.D. of yield spread .154 .069
S.E. of estimate .089 .046
Multiple correlation coeffi-
cient .838 .772
F statistic of multiple cor-
relation coefficient 18.25 16.14
NOTE: See Appendix for definition of symbols.
sions run for spreads not corrected for coupon differences and in the
two regressions covering bonds with the same coupon rate (Table 5-5).
In each of the six regressions, all twelve change-in-yield variables
covering the year preceding the month of observation have positive
regression coefficients.46 Not all of the regression coefficients were
example, the one-month change in seasoned yields might equal a certain fraction of the
difference between the equilibrium level of seasoned yields at the end of the month and
actual levels of seasoned yields at the beginning of the month. This model would have
different implications for yield spreads than would the model tested here, particularly at
turning points.
Only four change-in-yield variables were used in the Kaplan series, but when the
variables for the change in Moody new issue yields (M30—M41) were used as independent
variables with the Kaplan spread, all twelve had positive regression coefficients.178 Essays on Interest Rates
statistically significant individually, but the uniformly positive signs
make them collectively more significant than is indicated by their in-
dividual t-values and F statistics.47 A weighted average of changes in
yields over the past year therefore appears to be a very significant
variable. The weights show a clear tendency to decline as the lag be-
comes longer, particularly in the case of the Moody series. This is to be
expected whether the change-in-yields variables are important be-
cause of their influence on underwriters' expectations or because of a
lag in the adjustment of seasoned rates.
The twelve change-in-yield variables explain 70 per cent and 60 per
cent, respectively, of the total variance in the Moody and Homer
regressions for spreads corrected for coupon differences. In the equa-
tions for spreads uncorrected for coupon difference the change-in-
yield variables increase theexplained variance by a smaller percentage
but a statistically significant amount.
This finding, however, is consistent with either hypothesis, the one
concerning underwriting risks or that concerning imperfections in the
capital market, or with both. (We will return later to the problem of dif-
ferentiating between these hypotheses.) Part of the correlation of the
change-in-yield variables with yield spread, furthermore, may be
spurious. The observation for the level of new issue yields can be
viewed as a random variable, the mean of a sample drawn from a
theoretical population of new issue yields. Any random influence on
the sample mean for the new issue yields, causing it to deviate from the
population value, will result in a corresponding change in the recorded
new-seasoned spread.48 This would cause an upward bias in the co-
efficient of the change-in-yield variable for the month immediately
prior to the observation (i.e., X30) and also in the correlation coefficient.
It would bias the other regression coefficients only if there is positive
autocorrelation of the error terms in the regression equation. Un-
fortunately, there seems to be autocorrelation in our equations;
hencethe possibility of bias extends to the change-in-yield variables of
earlier periods as well.50
probability of a t-value greater than 1.64 would be .10, greater than 1.96 would
be .05, and greater than 2.58 would be .01 if there were in fact no relation between the
independent and dependent variables.
48errorof measurement or factors omitted from the regression which influence the
new issue but not the seasoned market would lead to the same problem.
49 problemof autocorrelation will be discussed below.
a partial check on the severity of this problem, we tried a new specification, com-
puting the change-in-yield variables from the yield on long-term governments rather
than from the yield on corporate new issues. This reduces. the spurious correlation be-
tween the yield spread and the change in yield in the preceding month. In applying thisYield SpreadonCorporate Bonds 179
Volume of New Issues. It was hypothesized above that the volume
of new issues competing for investment funds might affect underwrit-
ing risk and, thereby, the size of the new-seasoned yield spread. This
hypothesis received only moderate statistical support. Some measures
of new issue volume were statistically significant when included in
regressions along with the change-in-yield variables, but the levels of
significance were not high enough, nor were the results consistent
enough, to lend any certainty to the hypothesis.5'
Among the different measures of volume tested in the study were (a)
Aa corporate bonds, (b) Aaa through Baa corporate bonds, (c) all
corporate bonds including both public offerings and private place-
ments, (d) all corporate securities including both bonds and equities,
(e) all corporate securities plus home mortgages, (f) all corporate
plus two-thirds of state and local bonds,52 (g) all corporates plus
newly issued government bonds with maturities of fifteen years or
more, and (h) all of these bonds. Simple and multiple regressions sug-
gested that either all corporate bonds or all corporate securities in-
cluding both bonds and equities were the best measures, although the
results were not entirely consistent.53
In general, the best correlations were obtained using the volume for
the month of the observation of yield spread plus the two months pre-
ceding. However, the best length of period varied from two to five
months for different volume measures.
It seemed possible that the volume of new issues anticipated in the
procedure we employed a distributed lag technique developed by Shirley Almon after
our other regressions were estimated (Shirley Almon, "The Distributed Lag Between
Capital Appropriations and Expenditures," Econometrica, January 1965, pp. 178—181).
This procedure generated a smoothly declining set of weights for the change-in-yield
variables, and moderate reduction in the variance explained by these variables (from
70 and 60 per cent to 40 and 49 per cent in the Moody and Homer series, respec-
tively). This change in procedure does not eliminate the possibility of bias, however,
because changes in yields on governments in the month preceding the month of observa-
tion are correlated with changes in new issue yields, and may therefore be spuriously cor-
related with the yield spread.
One problem caused by using new issue volume as an independent variable is that
the volume is realty endogenously determined. For this reason, the use of volume in-
volves problems of simultaneous equations bias.
In his study of new-seasoned yield spreads for state and local government general
obligation bonds, Richard West found that the regression coefficients for various meas-
ures of market volume (current or expected) and for dealer's inventories were not sig-
nificantly different from zero.
52Two-thirdsof the state and local issues were included on the basis that this might
represent the long-term portion of the total.
Deduction of new issues intended for refunding made no apparent improvement in
the volume measures.180 Essays on Interest Rates
month following the observation for yield spread might also be rele-
vant. Measures for the securities registered for issue in the succeed-
ing month, for securities registered for issue in any future period
including the next month, and for securities actually issued in the suc-
ceeding month, however, did not prove significant in any of the mu!-
tiple regressions.
Tables 5-6 and 5-7 show the results of two regressions that gen-
erated relatively high t-values for volume as an independent variable.
TABLE 5-6. Summary of Regression for Moody New-Seasoned Yield
Spreads Corrected for Coupon and Including Volume as an Independent
Variable
Independent
Variable b t F
X30 (change in yield) .515 12.08 56.88
.260 5.91 11.20
X32+X33 .222 6.69 16.66
.220 6.72 22.37
X36+X37 .163 5.05 16.05
.163 . 4.97 18.57
X40+X41 .134 4.25 16.09
(volume) .038 2.61 6.79
Constant —.034
Number of observations 122
Mean of yield spread .097
S.D. of yield spread .153
S.E. of estimate .085
Multiple correlation coefficient .845
F statistic of multiple correlation
coefficient 35.40
NOTE: See Appendix for definition of symbols.
The equations used are for the Moody series with the same coupon
rate for new and seasoned issues; change-in-yield variables are in-
cluded in addition to volume.54 The volume measure in Table 5-6
(V61) covers new issues of corporate bonds and equities for the cur-
rent and two preceding months, while volume in Table 5-7 (V62) cov-
ers the same securities but includes three, rather than two, months
In Table 5-6 the change-in-yield variables after the first one are each for two-month
yield changes. This format was used at an earlier stage in the study, and does not sig-
nificantly affect the regression.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 181
TABLE 5-7. Summary of Regression for Moody New-
Seasoned Yield Spread Corrected For Coupon and Includ-
ing Level of Yields on Seasoned Bonds and Volume of
New Issues as Independent Variables
Independent
Variables b t












X21 (yield level) —.015 —1.04
V62 (volume) .028 2.10
Number of observations 121
Mean of yield spread .097
S.D. of yield spread .154
S.E. of estimate .088
Multiple correlation coefficient.846
F statistic for over-all
regression 19.01
NOTE: See Appendix for definition of symbols.
prior to the current month. The t-value for volume is not quite as high
when the level of yields is included in the regression, as in Table 5-7,
but it is still significant at the .05 level. This overstates the true con-
fidence level because a large number of volume measures were tried
in order to find one with a t-value as high as this.55
In the Homer equation, the t-value for the best volume measure is
1.97 (Table However, addition of the level of seasoned yields
This is true of all t-values for the volume variables.
The volume measure in the Homer regressions, V52, covers new corporate bonds
only, for the three months preceding the observation of the yield spread. Since the
Homer yield spreads apply to the first of the month while the Moody spreads are monthly
averages, the time periods of the volume variables in the Moody and Homer regressions
are approximately the same.182 Essays on Interest Rates
as an independent variable reduces it to .95, which is not statistically
significant.57
Level of Yields. Charts 5-1 and 5-2 suggest that the yield spread is
greatest when yields are high. For the most part, this is probably due to
the correlation of yield levels with other factors affecting the spread,
particularly with differences in coupon rates, which are larger when
yield levels are higher.58 Such an influence can be avoided by testing
yield levels in the equations covering new and seasoned bonds with the
same coupon rate.
The underwriting risk hypothesis indicates two reasons why the
level of yields may be relevant. First, when yields are high the yield
spread between long-term and short-term securities is small, or nega-
tive, making it more expensive to carry new issues (if holding periods
yields are directly related to yields to maturity). Second, underwriters
may fear that yields, Which have climbed to high levels, may continue
to rise.59 Yet, the opposite reaction is often viewed as more plausible:
When rates are high, dealers and investors may expect them to fall
back toward "normal." The direction of influence is therefore not
clear.
When the level of yields on seasoned bonds (unadjusted for coupon)
is added to the Moody regression (adjusted for coupon) its coefficient is
not significant (Table 5-7). In the Homer regression for spreads cor-
rected for coupon, however, the level of yields on seasoned bonds with
a coupon rate of 2* to 2* per cent is statistically significant at the .01
level in the multiple regression including the change-in-yield variables,
whether or not volume is also included as an independent variable
(Table 5-8). In the regression without a volume variable, the regression
coefficient for the level of seasoned yields has a t-value of 3.57, and the
F statistic for addition of the level of seasoned yields to the regression
is 12.75. The addition of the level of yields increases the coefficient of
multiple correlation from .772 to .795. The reason for the different re-
sults. in the Moody and Homer regressions is not clear.
simplecorrelation coefficient of volume (V65) and the level of yields (H21) is
.29 1.
58Partlyoffsetting this is the fact that the yield spread between bonds with the same
coupon rates will be smaller the higher the general level of yields. The reason is that at
a higher level of yields the risk of cair and limited capital gains of the higher coupon
bond appears smaller and hence the bond has a smaller risk premium. This relationship
implies that the level of yields has a negative influence where coupon rates are held con-
stant.
H.White study, p. 125.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 183
TABLE 5-8. Summary of Regressions for Homer New-Seasoned Yield
Spread Corrected for Coupon and Including Level of Yields on Seasoned
Bonds With a Coupon Rate of 2*—2* Per Cent and Volume of New Issues as
Independent Variables
Independent Variable b t b t b t
X30 (change in yields).243 9.12 .249 9.05 .246 9.17
X31 .136 4.98 .140 4.98 .136 4.98
X32 .087 3.21 .086 3.03 .086 3.16
X33 .090 3.40 .093 3.38 .091 3.40
x34 .053 2.01 .065 2.38 .053 2.02
X35 .065 2.47 .080 2.92 .068 2.58
X36 .105 4.04 .118 4.33 .111 4.15
X37 .068 2.60 .078 2.89 .072 2.72
X38 .040 1.53 .046 1.67 .043 1.63
X39 .062 2.30 .064 2.33 .063 2.34
X40 .034 1.26 .034 1.22.034 1.28
X41 .031 1.18 .034 1.27 .031 1.19
X21 (yield level) .024 3.57 .021 2.97
V65 (volume) .018 1.97 .0072 .95
Constant —.007 .044 —.018
Number of observations 144 144 144
Mean of yield spread .090 .090 .090
S.D. of yield spread .069 .069 .069
S.E. of estimates .044 .046 .044
Multiple correlation
coefficient .795 .780 .797
F statistic of over-all
regression 15.98 14.41 16.03
NOTE: See Appendix for definition of symbols.
Tightness in the Money Market. It was hypothesized that a tight
money market could increase the cost and difficulty of underwriting
new issues and, hence, contribute to a new-seasoned yield spread. To
measure tightness in the money market, tests were performed using
the level of free reserves, the yield spread between long-term and
short-term issues, and the yield on newly issued three-month Treasury
bills. On the basis of simple correlation coefficients, the bill rate was
chosen as the best measure. However, in the multiple regressions
covering the Moody and Homer series corrected for coupon dif-
ferences, the regression coefficient for the bill rate was not significantly184 Essays on Interest Rates
different from zero at even the .10 per cent level in either series, al-
though it was positive in both.6°
Ratio of Slow-Selling to Total New Issues. It was hypothesized that
when new issues had been selling slowly in the recent past, under-
writers would bid low enough for new issues to permit their distribu-
tion at prices below those on comparable seasoned issues. This would
suggest that the new-seasoned yield spread would be positively corre-
lated with the proportion of new issues which had moved slowly in the
recent past. A new issue was defined as slow-selling if it was still in
syndicate on the Monday following the date of issue. The ratio of such
issues to total new issues of A, Aa and Aaa public utilities was calcu-
lated for the month preceding the observation of yield spreads, and
separately for the month before that one. However, using either the
Moody or Homer series corrected for coupon, the coefficients for the
ratio of slow-selling to total new issues in each of the two preceding
months were not statistically significant, even at the .10 level, in mul-
tiple regressions including the volume of new issues during the pre-
vious three months, the level of yields, and four variables measuring
the change of yields during the previous twelve months.
Summary of Findings from Full Period Regressions. On the basis of
the regressions run for the full period from 1952 through 1963, we can
draw the following conclusions concerning the three major hypotheses
which were being tested:
(1) Coupon differences between the bonds in the new issue and sea-
soned series explain a large part of the average level and the variance
of the new-seasoned yield spread as it is usually recorded. Differences
between the average coupon rates on the bonds used in the new issue
and seasoned issue series accounted for an average of 41 and 62 per
cent of the spread and for 57 and 87 per cent of the variance of the
spread for the Moody and Homer series, respectively.
(2) A weighted average of changes in new issue yields over the pre-
ceding year has been found to be very important as an explanatory
60Ina previously published summary of this study, the bill rate was included in the
regression covering the Homer series corrected for coupon because its regression co-
efficient had a t-value of 2.69. However, subsequent changes in the other variables in
the regression and extension of the time period covered by the regression sharply re-
duced the coefficient.
Using regression equations which included four rather than twelve separate variables
to measure the change in new yields over the preceding twelve months and which in-
cluded the volume of new corporate securities including equities issued in the current
month and in the preceding one, the regression coefficient of the bill rate had t-values of
.43 and 1.31, respectively, in the Moody and Homer regressions.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 185
variable in the regressions for yield spread —accountingfor between
60 and 70 per cent of the variance of the spread remaining after
correction for coupon. This was suggested by the consistently posi-
tive and generally significant regression coefficients of the twelve
lagged change-in-yield variables used in the regressions, both with
and without correction for coupon. The results give strong support to
either or both of two hypotheses. In the first, new-seasoned spreads
increase when new issue yields have been rising, because underwrit-
ers are led to believe that the yields will continue to rise in the near
future. Consequently, underwriters reduce their bids and offering
prices on new issues to assure rapid distribution, which further causes
new issue yields to exceed the yields on comparable seasoned issues.
The second hypothesis is that new-seasoned spreads increase follow-
ing a rise in new issue yields because yields on seasoned issues lag be-
hind those on new issues. Thus, when new issue yields rise, the spread
widens.
However, the multiple regressions give no basis for deciding between
these two hypotheses, and there remains the problem of spurious cor-
relation. As has already been seen, both hypotheses are supported by
institutional considerations. Additional tests will follow shortly which
were made in an attempt to discover the importance of each hypothesis.
(3) Moderate statistical support was found for including a variable
measuring the volume of new issues of corporate bonds or of corpo-
rate bonds and equities for the month of observation of the yield spread
plus the two preceding it. The interpretation placed on this was that
when the market becomes congested with new issues competing for in-
vestment funds, underwriters foresee greater difficulty in distribut-
ing them and, accordingly, reduce their bids and offering prices for
new issues. Thus the yields on new issues are increased above those
on comparable seasoned issues. However, the levels of the signifi-
cance and consistency of the results were not great enough to lend any
certainty to the hypothesis.
(4) The level of seasoned yields had no explanatory power in the
Moody regression of spread corrected for coupon, but it was statis-
tically significant with a positive regression coefficient in the coupon-
corrected Homer regression.
(5) No statistical support was found for the hypothesis that under-
writers' pricing policies might be affected by the speed of sale of re-
cent issues, as measured by the ratio of slow-selling to total new
issues in the recent past.
(6) No statistical support was found for the hypothesis that money186 Essays on Interest Rates
market conditions, as measured by the Treasury bill rate, affect the
new-seasoned spread.
ANALYSIS OF SUBPERIODS. During the earlier stages of this study, re-
gressions similar to those covering the full period, January 1952—
December 1963, were run separately for periods of rising yields and
periods of falling yields using the Moody data. Similarly, separate
regressions were run for each of three complete specific cycles in
interest rates.61 These subperiod regressions are presented in Tables
5-9 and 5-10. The yield variables M30, M56, M57, and M58 are some-
what different from those used before, but not importantly. Exact
definitions are given in the Appendix. On the whole, the same varia-
bles that explain the variation in yield spreads in the full period seem to
explain most of the variation in each of the subperiods as well. The
following are the main points suggested by the subperiod regressions.
(1) The volume measure showed an inconsistent pattern in the sub-
period runs, as it had in variously specified equations covering the
whole period. In coupon-corrected equations that included the bill
rate, volume was significant at the .01 level in the first two interest
rate cycles, as it was during periods of rising yields, but it was not in
the third interest rate cycle or in periods of falling yields. (In the re-
gression uncorrected for coupon, volume was not significant in runs
that included the bill rate in either subperiod or full-period regres-
sions.)
(2) In regressions that do not include bill yields, the coefficients of
the change-in-yield variables were of the same general order of magni-
tude during periods of rising yields and those of falling yields, and dur-
ing the individual interest rate cycles, as they were during the entire
period. In coupon-corrected regressions that included bill yields, how-
ever, the coefficients of the change-in-yield variables were considerably
smaller for the separate interest rate cycles than for the period as a
whole. This was most notably the case for the more remote change-in-
yield variables.
(3) In each of the three interest rate cycles, but not in the regres-
sions for periods of rising and falling yields, the Treasury bill rate
61Theperiods of rising rates were January 1952 through May 1953, April 1954
through October 1957,JuIy 1958 through September 1959, and January through Decem-
ber 1963. The periods of falling rates were September 1953 through March 1954,
November 1957 through June 1958, and October 1959 through January 1963. The first
interest rate cycle was January 1952 through March 1954, the second was March 1954
through June 1958, and the third was June 1958 through January 1963.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 187
proved to be statistically significant at the .05 level; and in the case of
the second and third cycles it was statistically significant at the .01
level (Table 5-10). As noted above, when the bill rate was added to the
regressions for the first and second cycles, though not the third one, it
considerably reduced the significance of some of the change-in-yield
variables, since the correlation of the bill rate and the change-in-yield
variables is considerably higher in the individual interest rate cycles
than in the whole period. Since very strong support has already been
found for the change-in-yield variables, it might be that the bill rate is
acting as a proxy for those variables and is statistically significant for
that reason.
TABLE 5-9. Summary of Full Period and Subperiod Regressions for Moody








(1) M,(2) M2(3) M,(4) M2(5) M1(6) M2
Part A
b, for M10 (coupon differences) .279 — .292 — .378 —
b2 for M30 (change in yields) .485 .510 .474 .645 .328 .446
b3forM56 .250 .239 .235 .313 .083 .145
b4forM57 .136 .224 .136 .255 —.040 .250
b5forM58 .157 .210 .096 .144 .131 .257
b6 forV60(volume) —.016 .043 .004 .056 —.056 .049
Constant —.010—.005 —.003—.037 —.067—.020
t for b1 11.934 — 9.696 — 9.034 —
t for b2 9.42812.257 6.50111.9504.3466.497
r for 5.0355.892 3.4635.99 1 1.0561.963
tforb4 3.1136.343 2.1325.497 —.5533.830
t for b5 4.3627.542 2.5274.590 2.32 15.082
tforb6 —.7072.238 .1362.176—1.6641.536
Number of observations 128 128 77 77 57 57
Mean of yield spread .172 .096 .222 .143 .114 .042
S.D. of yield spread .230 .150 .238 .149 .229 .160
S.E. of estimate .100
Multiple correlation coefficient .906







tion coefficient 92.0254.25 94.0845.81 37.9616.57











(1) M1(2) M2(3) M,(4) M2(5) M,(6) M2
Part B
b,forM10(coupondifferences)—.151 — .314 — .459 —
b2 forM30 (change in yield) .795 .357 .426 .464 .375 .639
b3forM56 .555 .125 .163 .118 .178 .352
b4forM57 .374 .186 .069 .164 .086 .329
b5forM58 .327 .027 .102 .160 —.018 .191
b6 forV60(volume) .001 .064 .023 .159 —.012—.003
Constant .175—.021 —.020—.182 —.247 .062
t for b1 —1.094 — 17.065 — 15.287 —
(for b2 6.0486.94812.4567.948 6.9489.997
t for b3 4.9092.163 5.3762.205 3.4935.601
t for b4 4.6773.493 2.3763.376 1.9255.762
tforb5 3.427 .515 3.4613.447 —.5955.246
t for b6 .0432.302 .9484.087 —.542—.088
Number of observations 21 21 44 44 54 54
Mean of yield spread .131 .070 .256 .148 .154 .069
S.D. of yield spread .161 .096 .250 .159 .227 .164
S.E. of yield estimate .034 .040 .043 .077 .060 .084
Multiple correlation coefficient .985 .933 .987 .890 .968 .874
F statisticof multiple correla-
tion coefficient 74.10720.157235.60228.879118.22131.094
NOTE: See Appendix for definition of symbols.
AUTOCORRELATED ERRORS. A statistical problem encountered in the
regressions used in the study is autocorrelation of the residual error
terms. Although Durbin-Watson statistics were not computed for the
residuals of the regressions run in the main part of this study, some
checks showed that the Durbin-Watson statistics were typically be-
tween 1.2 and 1.6. This indicates a highly significant, positive first-
order autocorrelation of the residuals.
Autocorrelation of errors does not introduce a bias into the least-
squares estimates of the true parameters as long as the model is not
autoregressive. However, even in the nonautoregressive case the
statistical significance of the regression coefficients, as measured by
their t-values, is overstated because of the underestimation of the
standard errors of the regression coefficients computed by ordinary
least-squares. Moreover, if the regression equation with autocorrelatedYield Spread on Corporate Bonds 189
TABLE 5-10. Summary of Regressions by Interest Rate Cycle for Moody
New-Seasoned Yield Spread Corrected for Coupon, Including Treasury
Bill Rate as an Independent Variable
Interest Rate Cycle
#1 #2 #3Entire Period
b1 for M30 (change in yields) .259 .433 .628 .509
b2forM56 .035 .066 .314 .235
b3forM57 .078 .012 .269 .217
b4forM58 —.014 .001 .073 .204
b5 for V60 (volume) .055 .103 .017 .0409
b6for1'20 (bill yields) .104 .095 .074 .0051
Constant —.186 —.266 —.180 —.0134
tofb1 3.975 8.786 10.415 12.13
tofb2 .517 1.417 5.166 5.67
tofb3 1.121 .221 4.635 5.50
tofb4 —.285 .010 1.316 6.34
t of b5 2.167 2.934 .592 2.07
tofb6 2.113 4.175 2.694 .43
Number of observations 21 44 54 128
Mean of yield spread .070 J48 .069 .096
S.D. of yieldspread .096 .159 .164 .150
S.E. of estimate .004 .064 .079 .086
Multiple correlation coefficient .950 .926 .892 .831
Fstatistic of multiple correla-
tion coefficient 21. .419 37.378 30.49944.94
NOTE: See Appendix for definition of symbols.
errors is autoregressive, the least-squares estimates of the regression
coefficients will be biased, even asymptotically.
Because of autocorrelation, the significance levels of the regres-
sion coefficients are lower than those indicated by the t-values listed.
Second, the autocorrelation suggests that some errors may have been
made in the specification of the relationship tested. That is, some
significant variables may have been omitted or the form of the variables
or the equation may be imperfect. Third, the coefficients of the change-
in-yield variables may involve a bias, as already noted.
TIME REQUIRED FOR SEASONING. The above analysis of yield spreads is
based on the assumption that there are no systematic differences be-190 Essays on Interest Rates
tween new and outstanding issues, other than coupon rate differences,
that would account for any significant part of the spread. This implies
that any spread which exists at the time of issue, after correction for
coupon differences, should disappear after the new issue has been out-
standing long enough for the market to equilibrate itself. Does the
spread in fact vanish after the new bond has become seasoned? And, if
so, how long does this take?
In order to make this part of the study meaningful, we had to select
periods when new-seasoned spreads were reasonably high and re-
mained high, so that the closing of the yield gap between individual
recent issues and seasoned averages would not merely reflect the elimi-
nation of yield spreads between new and seasoned issues generally.
The periods chosen were March through May 1953, May 1956 through
March 1957, and June through September 1959.
The average yield spread on Aa utilities for all new issues during
these periods was 9.0 basis points after correction for coupon. The
average spread on these issues one month after the issue date was 3.8
basis points. After two months the spread was 3.1 basis points, after
three months it was —1.0 basis points, and from then through the eighth
month the average fluctuated within a narrow range above and below
zero.
On the average, initial yield spreads on utilities thus appear to be
eliminated within two to three months of the date of issue. White, using
a somewhat different procedure, arrived at a similar conclusion.62
Homer, in describing the recent issue market, wrote that "for a period
up to, say, three months it [the volume of trading in a recent issue]
will continue far larger than for seasoned bonds. At about that point
trading activity will die out, and the issue will take its place as just one
more seasoned utility." 63
In addition, we carried out a brief study of the seasoning time re-
quired on federal obligations. The paucity and heterogeneity of new
issues made it difficult to interpret the available data, but the indication
seems to be that the new issue yield spread disappears somewhere be-
tween two and four months after issue. Our procedure was first to
measure the monthend differences between the yields of bonds issued
during the month and the corresponding point on the government yield
curve. Omitting bills, certificates, and the 1+ per cent note series, there
was a positive yield spread in thirty-eight cases and a negative yield
62 White, p. 133.
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spread in ten cases between March 1951 and December 1960.64 The
total spread among the bonds showing a positive spread was 352 basis
points; the total for those showing a negative spread was 28 basis
points. During the second month after issue the spread declined on
twenty-seven issues and increased on seven; the decline was 164 basis
points and the increase was 27.Bythe end of the third month twenty-
eight issues had shown a decline in spread from that at the end of the
first month, and eight showed an increase. In basis points the decline
from the end of the first month was now 244. During the fourth month
there was no change in the number of recent issues for which the
spread had changed since time of issue, but the total spread declined
12 more basis points net. In the fifth month after issue the spread de-
clined on three more issues, and the net spread in basis points did not
change. From that time on the behavior of spreads was random.
These tests confirm that yield spreads are not due to systematic dif-
ferences in the characteristics of new and outstanding issues (other
than coupon rate), and tend to support a hypothesis explaining spreads
in terms of market imperfections. The fact that the spreads persist for
a period of two to three months after issue suggests that market imper-
fections prevent more rapid arbitrage. The tests are not inconsistent,
however, with the hypothesis which attributes yield spreads partly to
underwriting risk. The regression results, moreover, are consistent
with both hypotheses. We now turn to three additional tests designed
to evaluate these two hypotheses, as well as throw light on the connec-
tion between the new issue, recent issue, and seasoned issue markets.65
UNDERWRITING RISKS VERSUS MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AS AN EX-
PLANATION OF YIELD SPREADS. The first two of the following three
tests deal with the market imperfections hypothesis, and the third
deals with the underwriting risk hypothesis.
(1) Suppose new issue yields turn downward from month t to month
t + 1, but that even in month t + 1 these yields are above those on
seasoned bonds in month t. If yields in the seasoned issue market lag
behind those in the new issue market, seasoned yields would continue
64Theyield curves used in this study were those prepared by the Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company.
William H. White states in his study that "even though the amplitude of variation of
the yields on seasoned bonds is smaller than that on new issues, the yields on the two
types of bonds are closely synchronized in regard to the timing of peaks, troughs, and
major discontinuous changes." White, p. 136.192 Essays on Interest Rates
to rise when new issue yields are above them, attempting to close the
spread, despite the falling rates on new issues. If, on the other hand,
seasoned yields turn downward along with new issue yields even
though the new issue yields in month t + 1 exceed the seasoned yields
in month t,it can be inferred that seasoned yields are directly in-
fluenced by yield-determining conditions and are not simply following
a distributed lag adjustment toward their equilibrium level.
Using the Moody corporate Aa series on seasoned issues and new
issues with the same coupon rate as the bonds in the seasoned aver-
age,66 the seasoned yields continued to rise in twenty-two of the thirty-
one cases where the new issue yield turned downward while remaining
above the level of seasoned yields; the reverse occurred in nine of the
thirty-one cases. Nothing conclusive can be inferred from this test, but
it suggests that the seasoned market lags the new issue market and,
therefore, supports the market imperfections hypothesis.
(2) Is the correlation between changes in seasoned yields and
changes in new issue yields the month before higher than the correla-
tion between changes in new issue yields and changes in seasoned
yields the month before? An affirmative answer would support the
hypothesis that seasoned yields tend to lag.
In the Moody Aa corporate series for the period from 1952 through
1963 (with the new issue series corrected for coupon as described
above), virtually no correlation was found between the first-dif-
ferences (one-month changes) of new issue yields and those of
seasoned yields for the preceding month, but there was a substantial
correlation (.50) between the first-differences of seasoned yields and
those of new issue yields for the preceding month. The correlation be-
tween first-differences of new and seasoned yields for the same month
was only slightly higher(.55).67Thus,when the first-difference in
seasoned yields is regressed on the change in new issue yields in the
same month and the preceding one the coefficient of multiple correla-
tion is very high (.83), and can be raised slightly (to .86) by the addi-
tion of the new issue rate change for the second month earlier.68
This latter series was derived by adding to Moody's seasoned series the new-
seasoned spread measured between Moody's new issue series and the series for the
yield on seasoned bonds with the same coupon rate as the new issue. The adjustment
affected the correlations very little.
67Therewas no correlation between the first differences of new issue yields and those
of new issue yields for the previous month, indicating that in predicting changes in
seasoned yields the change in new issue yields for the previous month is not simply a
proxy variable for the simultaneous new issue yield change.
68is possible that some of this correlation may be explained by the fact that the new
issue yield change of the preceding month is a proxy for the change in seasoned yields ofYield Spread on Corporate Bonds 193
The preceding two experiments support the conclusion that market
forces operate more rapidly on new issue yields than on seasoned ones.
Seasoned yield movements appear to follow new issue yield move-
ments with a distributed lag. The tests thus support the hypothesis that
frictions in the seasoned issue market are a cause of new-seasoned
yield spreads. They do not, however, preclude a role for the under-
writing risk hypothesis. The third test involves an examination of the
behavior of yields on recently issued bonds after their prices are freed
from syndicate price maintenance agreements.
(3) If new issue yields are higher than yields on outstandings be-
cause of underwriters' pricing policies, issues recently released from
syndicate should decline relative to new issues. A direct comparison
of yields on recently released issues with new issue yields is not pos-
sible because there are not enough new issues, in the weeks following
termination of a syndicate, with which to compare the yield on the
newly released issue. Instead, the test examines the behavior of yields
on recent issues during periods of some length when new issue yields
were predominantly rising and new-seasoned spreads were large. If the
yields on issues recently released from syndicate fell during such
periods, this would provide strong support for the underwriting risk
hypothesis.
Using the yield data for A, Aa, and Aaa utilities in the weekly issues
of Moody's Bond Survey, we found the percentage of bond issues
whose yields fell in the first week following the end of syndicate price
maintenance agreements, and the change from offering yield during the
first week, first two weeks, and first three weeks after release from syn-
dicate. T.able 5-1 1 shows these data for each of six periods between
1956 and 1966. The bottom line shows the average three-week change
in new issue yields during these periods and can be compared to the line
above it showing three-week changes on recently released issues.
It is evident from the first line of Table 5-11 that the yields on a sub-
stantial number of bonds fell immediately after the termination of the
syndicate despite the fact that new issue yields were predominantly
rising. Because of the erraticism of new issue yields, some of the de-
cline in yields on recent issues could be due to short periods of falling
new issue yields during the longer periods of rising yields. However, in
four of the six periods more than half of the recent issues fell —well
above what one would expect from erratic movements in new issue
yields. Furthermore, comparing the lower two lines in every one of
the six periods, the average yield change on recently released issues in



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 195
the three weeks following syndicate termination was either negative
or, if positive, far less than the average three-week change in new issue
yields.
The test thus suggests that there is, indeed, some tendency for under-
writers to underprice new issues. This test is limited, however, to
periods of rising new issue yields. It should be remembered, moreover,
that evidence also exists that some of the new-seasoned spread is
caused by imperfections in the capital markets. Thus, both hypotheses,
the one concerning the pricing policies of underwriters and that con-
cerning market imperfections, appear to have some validity.
THE SPREAD UNDER STABLE MARKET CONDITIONS. What conditions
would lead to the elimination of the yield spread? It is tempting to
approach this question through the regression equations, but this would
place on the equations a burden they clearly are not equipped to handle.
The value of the constants, for example, varies considerably among
the different equations.
Nevertheless, the evidence gathered here on the determinants of the
spread suggests that it would be close to zero under stable market
conditions. With one possible exception the three determinants of a
positive spread discussed above presuppose rising market rates. Under
stable markets, coupon rates on new issues would be similar to those
on seasoned issues;frictions in the market for seasoned bonds
would have no importance; and underwriters would not have to in-
corporate a premium in their offering yields based on an extrapolation
of past yield increases. Of course, the underwriters' aversion to risk
might be such that they will always include some "sweetener" in their
offering yield. However, if this differential consistently resulted in
extra profits under stable market conditions, competition among under-
writers would quickly erode it away.7°
The time series on yield differences during a few periods of rate
stability are consistent with these speculations. During the second
half of 1954, yield levels were stable and the yield differential hovered
around zero (see Charts 5-1 and 5-2). Again in the relatively stable
period from June 1962 to June 1963, yield differentials were only
slightly positive on balance in the Homer series and slightly negative
on balance in the Moody's series. This implies that the positive yield
69Yieldswould have to be stable for a fairly long period, of course, for this to hold
true.
70Itcould make a difference in this regard whether the market was stable, or un-
stable but without trend.196 Essays on Interest Rates
spreads during the period 1952—63 reflect largely, if not entirely, the
tendency for yields to rise on balance over that period.
Our explanation of yield spreads suggests further that a prolonged
period of falling yields would result in predominantly negative spreads.
Coupon rates on new issues would be lower than those on outstand-
ings, and thus would cause a negative spread. Past yield declines, fur-
thermore, would tend to generate a negative spread if market frictions
prevented the prompt adjustment of yields on outstandings. The pric-
ing policy of underwriters could also contribute to a negative spread
if they tended to extrapolate past rate declines and if competition be-
tween them was intense. Evidence from the 1930's appears to confirm
this. Comparison of a series of Moody Aa seasoned utility yields with
new issue yields on Aa utilities revealed that, on the average, spreads




Note: All yield series are monthly unless designated with a subscript q for
quarterly.
BBankers Trust, series of yields on Grade 2 public utility bonds.
CqAveryCohan, series of yields on Aa public utility bonds. Quarterly.
FFederal Reserve, series of yields on long-term U.S. government bonds.
G Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, series of yields on long-term U.S. gov-
ernment bonds.
H Sidney Homer, series of yields on Aa public utility bonds.
K Mortimer Kaplan, series of yields on "recently issued" Aa corporate
bonds.
M Moody, series of yields on Aa corporate bonds.
SRatio of volume of slow selling to total newly issued Aaa, Aa and A
public utilities.
T Treasury bills, ninety-day, series of yields.
V Volume of newly issued securities.
71BraddockHickman offers an alternative explanation, namely, the inability of
agency ratings to keep up with market views. Since new issues came chiefly from firms
with better prospects than others with similar ratings, their lower yield could be at-
tributed in part to differences in investment quality among equally rated bonds. Brad-
dock Hickman, CorporateBond Qualityand Investor Experience, Princeton for NBER,
1958, p. 298. See also William H. White, p. 127.Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 197
X Symbol used in the tables summarizing the regression equations to
stand for the letter corresponding to the series studied. For example, X10
stands for M10 when used in a table for Moody data.
SUBSCRIPTS FOR SERIES
1—4New-seasoned yields spreads, new issue yield minus seasoned issue
yield; or underwriting yield spread.
10Coupon difference, average new minus average seasoned issue coupon.
20—22Level of yields, current month.
30—58Change in new issue yields over various periods.
60—65Variables relating to volume of new issues.
qQuarterly series.
Full Glossary
B BANKERS TRUST SERIES
B1Spread between yield on newly issued Bankers Trust Company Grade
2 public utilities and yield on seasoned Moody Aa public utilities. In per-
centage points. Both series are monthly averages of yields with issues
weighted by volume in the case of the new issue average. (Sources: data ob-
tained from Bankers Trust Company; Moody's Bond Survey)
B10Average coupon difference between newly issued Bankers Trust
Grade 2 utilities and seasoned Moody Aa utilities, 1957—63; average coupon
difference on Moody Aa corporates, new versus seasoned issues, 195 1—56.
All in percentage points. (Sources: Bankers Trust Company; Moody's Bond
Survey)
B20Yield on newly issued Bankers Trust Company Grade 2 public utili-
ties. In percentage points. (Source: Bankers Trust Company)
B30B41B30 is the change in yield on new Bankers Trust Grade 2 utilities
during the past month, measured as current yield minus yield of preceding
month. B31 is the change for the month before the last, B32 is the change for
the month before that, and so forth forthrough B41. in percentage points.
(Source: Bankers Trust Company)
C0 COHAN SERIES (QUARTERLY)
Yield on newly issued Cohan Aa public utilities. The Cohan series
consists of quarterly averages of yields on newly issued thirty-year Aa pub-
lic utility mortgage bonds which were sold to underwriters at competitive
bidding. In percentage points. (Source: Avery B. Cohan, "Yields on New
Underwritten Corporate Bonds, 1935—1958," The Journal of Finance,
December, 1962, and data supplied directly to us for 1959—60)198 Essays on Interest Rates
F FEDERAL RESERVE SERIES
F21Yield on outstanding long-term U.S. government bonds, Federal Re-
serve series. Yields are monthly averages of daily quotations. (Source: Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin)
F30—F53F30 is the change in yield on outstanding long-term government
bonds, Federal Reserve series, current yield minus yield of preceding month.
F31 is the change for the month before last, F32 is the change for the month
before that, and so forth for through F53. (Source: Federal Reserve
Bulletin)
G SALOMON BROTHERS AND HUTZLER
G21Yield on outstanding long-term U.S. government bonds, Salomon
Brothers and Hutzler series. Yields are for the first of the month. (Source:
Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, "An Analytical Record of Yields and Yield
Spreads")
G30_53G30 is the change in yield on outstanding long-term government
bonds, Salomon Brothers and Hutzler series, current yield minus yield of
preceding month. G31 is the change for the month before last, G32 is the
change for the month before that, and so forth for G33 through (Source:
Salomon Brothers and Hutzler)
H HOMER SERIES
H1Spread between the yield on Homer's newly issued callable Aa public
utilities and the yield on Homer's seasoned callable Aa public utility bonds
with per cent coupon. In percentage points. Both the new issue and
seasoned issue series are for yields as of the first of each month. (Source.:
Salomon Brothers and Hutzler; Mark W. Frankena)
H2Spread between the yield on new callable issues of Aa public utility
bonds, Homer series, and the yield on seasoned callable Aa public utility
bonds of current coupon. The yield on seasoned bonds of current coupon
means the estimated yield on seasoned bonds with coupon rate equal to that
on new issues for that date. This yield is calculated by interpolation and
extrapolation of yields on seasoned bonds in various coupon groups. In per-
centage points. The series are for the first of the month. (Source: Salomon
Brothers and Hutzler; Mark W. Frankena)
H10Difference between average coupon on newly issued Homer Aa util-
ities and the 2*—2* per cent coupon rate. (Source: data obtained from Sidney
Homer and Mark W. Frankena)
H20Yield on new issues, callable Aa public utility bonds, Homer series.
(Source: Salomon Brothers and Hutzler)
H21Yield on seasoned issues with 2*—2j- coupon, callable Aa public util-
ity bonds, Homer series. (Source: Salomon Brothers and Hutzler; Mark W.
Frankena)
H22Yield on seasoned issues with coupon rate equal to that on new issues,Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 199
callable Aa public utility bonds, Homer series. (Source: Salomon Brothers
and Hutzler; Mark W. Frankena)
H30—H41H30 is the change in yield on new Aa public utility bonds, Homer
series, current yield minus yield of preceding month. H31 is the change for
the month before last, H32 is the change for the month before that, and so forth
for H33 through H41. (Source: Salomon Brothers and Hutzler)
H56Change in yield on newly issued Aa public utility bonds, Homer series,
yield in preceding month minus average yield for two to three months preced-
ing. In percentage points. (Source: Salomon Brothers and Hutzler)
H57Change in yield on newly issued Aa public utility bonds, Homer series,
average yield of two to three months preceding minus average yield for four
to six months preceding. In percentage points. (Source: Salomon Brothers
and Hutzler)
H58Change in yield on newly issued Aa public utility bonds, Homer series,
average yield for four to six months preceding minus average yield for seven
to twelve months preceding. In percentage points. (Source: Salomon Broth-
ers and Hutzler)
K KAPLAN SERIES
K1Spread between yield on Kaplan recently issued Aa corporate bonds
and yield on Moody's seasoned Aa corporate bonds. In percentage points.
The Kaplan series is for monthly averages of Friday yields for recently
issued bonds and the Moody series is for monthly averages of yields. (Sources:
Moody's Bond Survey and data from Mortimer Kaplan, Federal Housing Ad-
ministration)
K10Average coupon difference between Kaplan recently issued Aa corpo-
rates and Moody seasoned Aa corporates. (Sources: Moody's Investors'
Service; Mortimer Kaplan)
K20Yield on recently issued Aa corporates, Kaplan series. (Source:
Mortimer Kaplan)
K30—K33K30 is the change in yield on recently issued Aa corporate bonds,
Kaplan series, current yield minus yield of preceding month. K31 is the
change for the month before last, K32 is the change for the month before
that, and K33 is the change for the month before that. In percentage points.
(Source: Mortimer Kaplan)
M MOODY SERIES
M1 Spread between yield on newly issued Aa corporates and yield on
seasoned Moody Aa corporates. Newly issued yields are Moody's specially
computed averages of offering yields on new issues (other than convertibles,
issues with warrants, and equipment trusts), weighted by amounts offered.
Seasoned yields are Moody's monthly average (averages of daily figures)
and includes yields on securities with various coupon rates. Figures are in
percentage points. (Source: Moody's Bond Survey)200 Essays on Interest Rates
M2 Spread between the yield on newly issued Aa corporates, Moody se-
ries, and the yield on seasoned Aa corporates with coupon rate equal to that
on new issues. In percentage points. (Source: Moody's Investors' Service)
M4 Moody new-seasoned yield spread as described under M1 plus un-
derwriter spread, which is the difference between the yield to maturity calcu-
lated from the offering price and the yield to maturity calculated from the
price at which the issue was sold to the underwriter. Underwriter spread thus
measures the difference between the investor's return to maturity and the
actual interest cost to the borrower. The underwriter spread is an average for
newly issued Aa corporates weighted by size of issue.
M10Difference between average coupon on newly issued Moody Aa cor-
porates and average coupon on seasoned Moody Aa corporates. (Source:
Moody's Bond Survey)
M20Yield on newly issued Aacorporates, Moody series. (Source: Moody's
Bond Survey)
M21Yield on seasoned Aa corporates, Moody series. (Source: Moody's
Bond Survey)
M22Yield on seasoned Aa corporates with coupon rate equal to that on
new issues, Moody series. (Source: derived from data supplied by Moody's
Investors Service)
M30—M41M30 is the change in yield on newly issued Aa corporates, Moody
series, current yield minus yield of preceding month. M31 is the change for
the month before last, M32 is the change for the month before that, and so
forth for M33 through M41. In percentage points. (Source: Moody's Bond
Survey)
M56Change in yield on newly issued Aa corporates, Moody series, yield
in preceding month minus average yield for two to three months preceding.
In percentage points. (Source: Moody's Bond Survey)
M57Change in yield on newly issued Aa corporates, Moody series, aver-
age yield of two to three months preceding minus average yield for four to
six months preceding. In percentage points. (Source: Moody's Bond Survey)
M58Change in yield on newly issued Aa corporates, Moody series, aver-
age yield for four to six months preceding minus average yield for seven to
twelve months preceding. In percentage points. (Source: Moody's Bond Sur-
vey)
SSLOW-SELLING ISSUES
S60Ratio of volume of slow-selling to total new Aaa, Aa and A public
utility issues. Ratio applies to month preceding the observation of yield spread
being explained. (Source: data from Sidney Homer)
S61Ratio of volume of slow-selling to total new Aaa, Aa and A public
utility issues. Ratio applies to next to last month before the observation of
yield spread being explained. (Source: Sidney Homer)Yield Spread on Corporate Bonds 201
T TREASURY BILLS
T20Monthly average of yields on newly issued three-month Treasury bills.
In percentage points. (Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin)
T21Yield on newly issued three-month Treasury bills on the Monday near-
est the first of each month. In percentage points. (Source: Federal Reserve
Bulletin)
V VOLUME OF NEW ISSUED SECURITIES
V60Volume of newly issued corporate securities, including bonds and equi-
ties, issued in the current and preceding month. In billions of dollars. (Source:
Federal Reserve Bulletin)
V61Volume of newly issued corporate securities, including bonds and equi-
ties, issued in the current and the two preceding months. In billions of dollars.
(Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin)
Volume of newly issued corporate securities, including bonds and equi-
ties, issued in the current and three preceding months. In billions of dollars.
(Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin)
V63Volume of newly issued corporate securities, including bonds and equi-
ties, issued in the two preceding months. In billions of dollars. (Source:
Federal Reserve Bulletin)
V64Volume of newly issued corporate bonds, including public offerings
and private placements, issued in the current and two preceding months. In
billions of dollars. (Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin)
V65Volume of newly issued corporate bonds, including public offerings
and private placements, issued in the three preceding months. In billions of
dollars. (Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin)T
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